THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*
A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 10. JANUARY, 1925. Vol. XIV.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Bolshevism and Russian Christianity.

The Bolshevist campaign against Christianity in Russia is exciting considerable attention. It is natural that it should do so, for it seems to be growing in its scope and is being attended with a large measure of success. It is aimed mainly at terrorizing the clergy and at converting the young to atheism. The clergy appear in the majority of cases to have endured persecution, ending in not a few cases in actual martyrdom, with heroic fortitude. The Russian peasantry, who only coveted to own the lands they farmed and to be freed from the miseries of war, have as little understanding of, as they have sympathy with, the ideals of Bolshevism. They are for the most part well disposed to the Orthodox Church and love its services, and regard its clergy as serving a needful function in securing their salvation. They would, however, prefer that the clergy should exist without offerings and dues; nevertheless as practical persons they recognize that this is impossible, and so are willing to enable their parish priest to live in the same condition as they do themselves.

It is in the towns that atheism is making alarming progress, and especially among the younger people. It is represented by the Bolshevist leaders as part of a great policy of liberation —a liberation which includes not only the human body, but also the human intellect and moral consciousness. The usual Bolshevist method of attacking the Christian religion has been to hold it up to ridicule, and ridicule of the coarsest kind. Its beliefs are presented as absurdly grotesque and utterly futile. But ridicule is not sufficient. Two other methods are used. Christianity is presented as the religion *par excellence* of the

despised and hated *bourgeoisie*. It creates and maintains thei mentality. It fosters their vices. Stamp it out, and the las refuge of the *bourgeoisie* is annihilated. The third method i to present Christianity as the supreme cause of human misery and not least of those forms of misery through which Russia ha been passing since 1914. To an illiterate populace who hav suffered terribly and are still suffering, to point to anything a the cause of their intolerable misery is to excite their prejudic against it, and when the Bolshevist leaders point to the recen war as the product of that capitalist system which has receive the support of the Christian Churches, it is readily believed and certainly is not easily shown to be fallacious, although a an attack upon essential Christianity it is absolutely fallacious

It is that which brings us to the real point. The Christianit which the vast majority of Russians have had presented to ther has been ecclesiastical, ceremonial, and dogmatic. The ethica teaching of the Christian religion has been largely absent. Th parish priests of Russia do not deliver sermons, and a populac of which three-fourths at least are illiterate cannot obtain thei Christian teaching through Bible study. A Dostoievsky and Tolstoi may read their New Testaments and be converted b them, but they are very rare exceptions. As a consequence th Christian religion in Russia has been almost entirely separate from those ideals of conduct and character with which it is stil closely connected in Great Britain. And we dare to believ that it was this neglect by the Orthodox Russian Church of thi most important element in the Christian religion which ha helped to render possible the present state of things in Russia The same was true of the Roman Catholic Church in Franc before the Reign of Terror. It was the disloyalty of organize Christianity to the fundamental Gospel of Jesus which gave th opponents of the Church their power to persecute it. It was th character of English Christianity which had not a little to d with saving England from similar horrors. It is highly impor tant to bear this in mind. It is not all Christianity, as is com monly supposed by Christians, which is a bulwark against th horrors and immoralities of anarchy, but *true* Christianity. O a false Christianity in such a crisis we may use the words of th Hebrew prophet, 'Thy calf, O Samaria, hath cast thee off.'

The Revolution in the Church of England.

Liberal Churchmen, who have been growing more and more perturbed by the form which Prayer Book revision has been assuming as the outcome of an astute endeavour to Romanize our Church services under the guise of revising them, have received an additional shock from the Patronage Report. This Report, while making drastic proposals for the alteration of patronage, does practically nothing to increase the power of the parochial laity to withstand the appointment of an obviously unsuitable incumbent. It does, however, propose to increase very greatly the powers of the bishops in the administration of patronage. The powers of the bishops are already very great in this matter; they are the patrons of 3,000 out of a total of 13,775 livings in the Church. In addition, they have a vast deal of patronage in the appointment to all the higher offices except deaneries, bishoprics, and crown canonries. They appoint assistant and suffragan bishops, archdeacons, canons residentiary, prebendaries, honorary canons, and rural deans. This will strike most Churchmen as a sufficiently serious responsibility for our over-worked bishops without increasing it. There is only one reason for increasing episcopal powers of patronage, and that is that it is evident to all men that the bishops administer their patronage better than other patrons. At present there is no evidence that this is the case. The *Guardian's* criticism of the Patronage Report seems to us to be entirely justified :

> 'The more we examine it in detail, the more unsatisfactory its provisions appear. To bestow large further powers, and to throw new responsibilities, on the diocesan bishops; to suggest the setting up of Patronage Boards on which the parochial Church council of the vacant benefice is to have no representative; to use such Boards only on the rarest occasions; and to propose that the sole additional privilege of the laity of the parish towards expressing 'an effective voice' in the choice of their minister should be the permission to write a letter to the patron—these are defects which, it is to be hoped, will be drastically dealt with when the Report is presented to the Assembly.'

Bishop Frodsham, of Halifax, in a carefully reasoned letter to the *Times*, which will carry weight with many, points out the hardship of the proposals as they bear on those patrons who are the incumbents of mother parishes. If it be right that bishops should administer so much patronage by virtue of their office, it is manifestly unjust to deprive other eminent clergymen in

charge of great parishes of the patronage which they administer by virtue of their office. At present they appoint to 1,265 livings.

The Evangelical party, which has become so accustomed to defeat at the hands of the Anglo-Catholics that without considerable liberal backing it seems incapable of any effective opposition, has had its alarm voiced by Sir William Joynson-Hicks in his presidential message to the National Church League:

> 'As those who love their Church, we cannot but feel grave anxiety in looking forward to the immediate future. It is probable that the final stages of Prayer Book revision, so far as the Church Assembly is concerned, will be reached during the present year. How serious are the changes which have been agreed upon by the House of Clergy I need hardly remind you. If finally adopted, they would give the force of law to a service practically the same as the Roman Mass. It was plainly stated in the House of Clergy that Reservation of the Sacrament was desired not merely for the sick, but in order that people might offer adoration to the consecrated elements. And what else but this was meant by the Bishop of London when, only a fortnight ago, in a sermon at the Church of St. Magnus the Martyr, he said that 'he would offer no obstacle to the faithful saying their prayers in the presence of the reserved sacrament'? The plain fact is that a determined effort is being made to undo the work of the Reformation in the Church of England. The aim is disguised by plausible sophistries which have long deceived people; but there is no excuse now for any delusion in the matter. Books containing Roman teaching are being circulated by thousands. Clergy in hundreds of parishes are performing services which differ in no essential from those of the Church of Rome: and the bishops encourage them by their presence and their patronage.
>
> 'At the same time that the doctrine of the Church is being thus changed, an attempt is being made to increase the power of the bishops by making a large addition to the patronage, already too great, which is in their hands. If the proposals on this matter, which are to come before the Church Assembly in February, are finally adopted, most of the principal parishes, such as those in Bath, Bradford, Cheltenham, Clifton, Tunbridge Wells, Oxford, Cambridge, Hull, Beverley, Jesmond, Plymouth, Birmingham, and many other leading towns, would be taken from the hands of evangelical trustees and handed over to the bishops. If anyone wishes to know what the result would be, let him study the lists of episcopal appointments, and he will soon learn. The duty of loyal Churchmen is clear. We are not at liberty to barter the heritage of truth which has come down to us. If it were merely a question of a few trivial ceremonies, I for one should offer no opposition; but I am not prepared to stand idly by when the whole character and administration of the Church of this country are being assailed.'

Sir William does not, however, deal with another matter hardly less serious, namely, the steady attack which is being worked up

against the present method of appointing bishops by the Crown. It is commonly believed that if the Crown can be compelled to surrender this right, the highly organized Catholic party would be able within a few years to secure a Catholic episcopate which would complete the purgation of the last traces of Protestantism from the English Church as a preliminary to uniting it with Rome.

If the threatened revolution in the constitution of the Church of England is to be checked and defeated, it can only be done by a close alliance between Evangelicals and Liberals. There is no sound reason why they should not unite for this purpose, for, although there are grave differences between the two, yet both are loyal to the principles of the Reformation, and both are utterly opposed to the Romanization of the Church of England. If the threatened revolution cannot be defeated in the Church Assembly, which seems more than likely, then it will be necessary to defeat it in Parliament.

All Liberal Churchmen who wish to see the Church Assembly grow in moral and spiritual influence and in representative character will hope that such a course may not be necessary. Whether the appeal to Cæsar will have to be made, appears to depend upon the action of the bishops. *Rem ad triarios rediisse.*

Islamic and Christian Liberalism.

We always read the *Islamic Review* with interest. To see Christianity through the eyes of an ardent Mohammedan propagandist is a valuable experience. Usually we must confess the articles of the *Islamic Review*, where they deal with non-Muslim religions, especially Christianity, seem to be lacking in understanding and tolerance. This, however, is not the case in a contribution to the January number by Al-Haj Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din on Islam as the religion of peace and love. It took the form of an address delivered at Bombay to a gathering representing various religions. The Khwaja, in answering the question: Who are Muslims? said:

> 'Let the *Qurán* answer the question for me: "Say, we believe in Allah and (in) that which has been revealed to us, and that which was revealed to Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and (in) that which was given to Moses and Jesus, and (in) that which was given to the prophets from their Lord. We do not *make distinction between* any of them, and to Him do we submit" (II, 136).

> 'We believe " in that which was given to the prophets from their Lord." And has not the Book said that every race, every community, every country, has been given a prophet, a guide, a warner from the Lord? And why not India? I, as a Muslim, am bound to pay my allegiance to all the prophets of the world. With the Qur-án I must accept the Bible in its original purity as my book from God. I claim the sacred Vedas and the wise sayings of Mazda as a joint property with my Hindu and Parsee brethren. I should not make distinction between a prophet and a prophet. Thus have I been enjoined in the Qur-án. And why should I? I have to submit to my Lord and not to a man. This is Islam. I must bow down, therefore, to His word, no matter whether it came from India or Arabia, provided it reaches me in its pristine purity. More than half the trouble becomes finished if we act upon this golden dictum of the Qur-án. I believe in the Divine origin of all ancient religions—for so the Qur-án says.'

This is indeed liberal, although it ought to be emphasized that the Khwaja teaches it not because it is liberal, but because it is the message of a strictly interpreted passage in the *Qurán*. The liberalism seems to us, however, to be inadequate. No doubt a true liberalism recognizes in every great religion and in the message of every great religious teacher an element of moral and religious truth, even as Whittier teaches.

> In Vedic verse, in dull Qurán,
> Are messages of good to man . . .
> The prophets of the elder day,
> The slant-eyed sages of Cathay
> Read not the riddle all amiss
> Of higher life evolved from this,
> Nor doth it lessen what He taught
> Or made the gospel Jesus brought
> Less precious, that His lips re-told
> Some portion of the truth of old.

But surely it is an unintelligent liberalism which makes no distinction between any of them. We learn perhaps best the real character of a religion by comparing it with other religions. We discover almost immediately that although they have much in common, yet there are important distinctions between all the great religions, and it is by examining and weighing these distinctions that we are enabled to decide as to which is the highest and best. One of the noblest of the early Christian missionaries to Islam decided that it is by its doctrine of God that every religion must be finally tested, and that judged by this test Christianity, which worships God as the highest form of love, is the most perfect of all religions. It seems to us that thir-

teenth century Raymond Lull was a liberal of the right kind: his liberalism was based on the recognition of moral and spiritual distinctions, not on the ignoring of them.

A Catholic Commentary on the Bible.

The *Times* of January 3rd publishes a statement that it is the intention of the English Church Union to publish shortly a Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture.

When we first heard of the project we were intrigued by the thought of a Catholic Commentary, and wondered what exactly it was proposed to achieve? It seemed to us that to complete the *Catena aurea* of St. Thomas Aquinas and to produce in English a Commentary consisting entirely of the exegetical comments of the great Church Fathers and Doctors on the whole text of Holy Scripture, duly arranged under each verse, would be of no little value. It would at least enlighten its students in many ways on the subject of Catholic exegesis, and would prove to them that while the commentators were all loyal members of the Catholic Church, they retained a very large degree of freedom of judgment which often led them to give conflicting expositions of Holy Scripture. However, it appears from the statement in the *Times* that the proposed Catholic Commentary is not of this kind. It is to be a one-volume commentary by modern Anglo-Catholic scholars, and is intended to serve the cause of Anglo-Catholic propaganda.

Mr. Arnold Pinchard, Secretary of the English Church Union, gives the following account of its *raison d'être*. He writes:

> 'There is, I think, a generally prevailing opinion in England to the effect that the Bible is a very Protestant book. Nothing could be further from the truth. From cover to cover there is no book in existence which is so essentially and consistently Catholic as is the Bible. But it is necessary to show this to people in order to convince them of the fact. Now there are at present two one-volume commentaries on Holy Scripture which are accessible—one of these (Dummelow) is wholly out of date and far behind the point of advance which modern knowledge and criticism have reached; the other (Peake), while not lacking in scholarship, is edited by a Nonconformist in the very spirit of Modernism, and is permeated through and through with an atmosphere of sheer Modernism. For want of a Catholic commentary on the Scriptures this book now holds the field, and is even being recommended by Bishops' examining chaplains to be read by ordinands in preparation for their examinations. It will be clear ,then, that there

is a real need for a commentary on Holy Scripture on Catholic lines and this need the union through its Literature Committee is now preparing to meet.'

It was Chillingworth, a convert from Romanism, who declared that 'the Bible alone is the religion of Protestants,' but it would entail an historical essay of some length to show how much justification there is for that statement. The Protestant Reformers always affirmed that if any tenet which they held could be shown to be contrary to the teaching of Holy Scripture, they were ready to abandon it, and they never swerved from this position. No doubt it is this Protestant practice, combined with the zeal which they have ever shown in the dissemination of Bibles, which has given the impression that the Bible is a very Protestant book. It ought to be noted that in this matter the Church of England is at one with all the Protestant Reformers. It was an English bishop who, when asked what was the religion of the Church of England, replied 'I should prefer to tell you, not what that religion is, but where it may be found. It is in the Bible.' No doubt commentaries do much to elucidate the meaning of Holy Scripture, but it is one of the characteristics of the Bible which it enjoys in common with other great classical literatures, that it is capable of making a profound appeal to its reader without the assistance of any commentary. Christian biography abounds with notable examples of this. It is possible to go even further than this and to affirm that the Bible, and for this we must needs be very thankful, is capable of holding its own in the teeth of commentators, whether Catholic or Protestant. For this reason we recommend to very plain and ignorant people the reading of the Bible without a commentary—not the whole Bible, but a number of carefully selected passages in it, not extracted from it; and following what we believe is the advice of Professor Quiller Couch, we should recommend the Old Testament in the Revised Version, and the New Testament in the Authorised Version.

For educated people, however, we should recommend Bible reading with various commentaries; some by good Catholics like Bishop Gore on the Epistle to the Ephesians, some by good Protestants like Sir George Adam Smith on Isaiah. We

do not, however, favour one-volume commentaries on the Bible: they are much too compressed for devotional reading; and much too positive in their statements for the searcher after truth. The truth-seeker not only wishes to know what is true, but also why it is true, and that demands space. Professor Peake's commentary seems to us much the best of its kind, but the kind is really not a good one.

We confess that we view with some apprehension the publication of a Catholic Commentary, as we should a Protestant Commentary or a Modernist Commentary. Commentators writing for such commentaries must almost of necessity experience some limitation in their range of vision and in their freedom of exposition, and limitation in these spheres reduces the value of the commentary. At any rate, all commentators on Scripture, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Modernist, would do well to bear in mind Coleridge's dictum: 'If anyone begins by loving Christianity more than truth, he will proceed to love his Church more than Christianity, and will end by loving his own opinions better than either.'

THE PRICE OF CHRISTIAN UNITY

By the Editor.

'Here, as everywhere, the Modernists are the enemies of unity.'
Church Times (Jan. 2, 1925).

'God's price is high,' sez he;
But nuthin' else than wut He sells
Wears long, an' that J.B.
May larn, like you an' me!
James Russell Lowell.

THE Primate's New Year letter on unity, addressed particularly to his own diocese, but intended, we may assume, for a wider destination, is optimistic in tone and makes special reference to the Lambeth Conference Appeal to all Christian People issued in August, 1920. That Appeal produced many conferences and these formulated a number of resolutions and replies, all the more important of which have been carefully collected and edited by the Very Reverend G. K. A.

Bell, formerly his Grace's chaplain, and were recently published in a handy volume by the Oxford University Press.[1]

These interesting documents all bear witness to a desire for Christian unity, but we have failed to find in any one of them any resolution on the part of any Christian Communion to sacrifice its particular principles, those which are the real cause of its separation from other Christian bodies, in order to secure Christian union. We do not refer to this attitude in order to condemn it: we are not sure that it is not commendable, at any rate in certain existing circumstances; we wish rather to point out its significance. It means that Christian unity is not primary for any existing communion, and it seems not unreasonable to suppose that not until Christian unity becomes primary will it be secured. We do not therefore feel any high degree of optimism with regard to the prospect of immediate Christian unity—that is organic unity, the unity which costs—for there is no Christian communion which is ready to make any real sacrifice for it. Approaches towards union or inter-communion which have so far been made (*e.g.* with the Church of Sweden and the Eastern Orthodox Church) have entailed no sacrifice of anything which is valued by those bodies which have secured it. It is very delightful when union can be secured in this way, but it would seem that Christendom has very little prospect of proceeding any further in this direction at present. The primrose-bordered portion of the path to re-union has now been traversed, and is about to terminate at a succession of rugged and slippery rock scarps, which, if we mistake not, will require to climb them much more in the way of resolution, enterprise, and resources, than the Church's leaders at present possess. Will not divided and disappointed Christendom then discover that it is not the Divine Will that it should seek further for organic unity, and that the prayer, 'that they all may be one,' refers to a unity of spirit, not of organization? Will it not ask whether an organic unity, which can only be obtained at the sacrifice of truth—by which we mean here fundamental moral and spiritual convictions—is not worth having, nor indeed ought to be purchased at that price?

[1] *Documents on Christian Unity*, 1920-4, edited by G. K. A. Bell, Dean of Canterbury. (Oxford University Press. 1924. Price 7/6 net.)

It seems to us that before the organic unity of Christendom can be secured, the Church's leaders will require to enlarge enormously their conception of Catholicity and to revise drastically their standard of moral and spiritual values. No responsible Church leader, so far as we are aware, has yet dared to unveil to a Christendom desiring organic unity the vision of a Catholic Church which is ready to include all who wish sincerely to be comprehended in it, whether Quakers, Unitarians, Romanists, or Christian Scientists. Yet such a Catholic Church is needed if we are to have organic unity, for Christian experience has proved, and is proving, that while some Christians need dogmas, others find them detrimental to their spiritual life, and that this is equally true of sacraments and regulations. The Society of Friends with its saintly Christian characters is a standing testimony to Christendom that sacraments are not necessary for the development and perfection of the Christlike life; and the noble Christian personalities of many English and American Unitarians affords equally strong testimony that complete dogmatic freedom does not lead to departure from Christ.

Moreover, the demand for such a comprehensive Catholic Church becomes more serious when it is recognized that these facts of Christian experience are being supported by historical research into Christian origins. Historical and literary criticism seem to indicate that neither dogmas, nor sacraments, nor ecclesiastical regulations, constituted an integral part of our Lord's Gospel of the Kingdom. There was no institutional side to that Gospel. Hence the Catholic Church of the future with our Lord's words ringing in her ears, 'Why call ye Me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I say?' will demand neither dogmas nor sacraments as essentials of membership, though she may value them and use them as factors in her corporate and social life. She will, however, demand no more of her members than the Church's Founder commanded, and she will plead for no less, namely, love to God and man—such a love as was manifested supremely in the life of Jesus Christ. She will substitute *amo* for *credo* in her formularies; *I love* for *I believe*; and emphasize practice rather than profession as the sign and seal of membership.

But this vision is too remote. It is a Pisgah-view. Mann moreover, is light food, and is loathed by the souls of those wh have tarried long by the flesh-pots of Egypt. The generatic that has lived in Egypt must first die off and give place to new generation disciplined under more simple and healthy co ditions, who will have courage to enter the Promised Lan Only when divided Christendom, if we may make use of illustration drawn from the Israelite prophet,[2] has been depriv of its ephod and its teraphim, its sacrifices and its obelisks, priests and its princes, which to-day it esteems as essential its religious life, will it be able to find its long lost unity in simpler faith, a purer worship, a less pretentious organizatio and a wide-embracing love.

Forces which are beyond the control of our ecclesiastic leaders—forces nourished by Christian social workers a philanthropists, Christian foreign missionaries, Christian my tics, and not least by Christian scholars and thinkers are movi the Christian Church in this direction. We all, willing and u willing, are on the march, and we shall lose much *impedimen* on the road, but in the end we shall arrive; we shall achie all the unity which the Christian Church either desires or quires. Whether when the Christian Church gets there she w feel very grateful to those who a century or two before talk much about re-union, will remain to be seen. Possibly she w feel more grateful to the prophetic teachers, Biblical critic Christian philanthropists and missionaries—the unflinching pr tagonists of the truth as it is in Jesus rather than as it appea in Church traditions and formularies—for having been t means of uniting Christendom, and that not by the devio devices of ecclesiastical diplomacy, but by recalling Christia to the fundamentals of the Gospel of the Kingdom of God.

It seems to us that these constant conferences to discu union bear a resemblance to the discussion of their symptor by valetudinarians. They are essentially recreational. This, we mistake not, is the view of Sir Henry Lunn. But recreati is permissible, and to-day there is a tendency to identify r creation with religion. This in certain conditions is not wron but when we are doing it, we ought to recognise what we a

[2] *Hosea* III, 4, 5.

about. It is usually maintained that these conferences have the advantage of leading to a better mutual understanding. This is true, if it mean that those engaged in the actual discussions get to understand each other better, but it does not seem to be true, if it mean that the communions they represent get to understand each other better. This is due no doubt to the careful 'packing' of the conferences so that in their constitution they become not really representative of the communions they are officially regarded as representing. Intransigent and difficult persons, who really represent the denominational difficulties which have to be tackled and overcome in solving the problem of reunion, are carefully excluded. This of course was conspicuously the case at the Malines Conferences; neither the Roman nor Anglican representatives were really representative of their respective communions as a whole. Hence their conferences were essentially recreational; probably if the sub-consciously excluded persons had been admitted the conferences might have lost something of their recreational atmosphere, but we venture to believe that they would have gained greatly in practical value.

There is another point which the Primate's appeal raises. It is often claimed with considerable complacency that the Church of England is peculiarly fitted to lead in the great campaign for reunion. That Church's central position in Christendom; its earnest desire to tread the *via media*; its wise reproofs addressed to too eager souls:

> 'Old things need not be therefore true,
> O brother men, nor yet the new':

justify its claim. We should feel more secure about it if the Church of England, not in the dark ages, but quite recently, had not deliberately excluded from its practising membership any man or woman who at the same time is a member of any other Christian body. When the Church of England did that it seemed to many that it displayed a temper and continued a policy (that of 1662) which has done much to weaken its claim to leadership in the great work of uniting the people of God who are scattered abroad.

DR. HENSON AND C.O.P.E.C.

By the Rev. W. M. Pryke, B.D., Rector of Risby, Bury St. Edmunds

IN November the Bishop of Durham delivered a Primary Charge to the clergy of his diocese. The Charge[1] is divided into two parts, and the whole of the second part consists of a detailed attack upon the Conference known familiarly as Copec which took place at Birmingham at the beginning of this year.

Dr. Henson's attack is of so sweeping, and, it must be added, of so one-sided a character, that one who like myself can claim only to have been among the rank and file of the Conference, and who indeed would not have been there at all but for the Bishop's determination not to allow the Diocesan Conference to send official delegates, must needs welcome the opportunity kindly afforded me by the Editor of the *Modern Churchman*, of dissenting with respectful emphasis from some of the contentions which the Charge embodies. At the same time, as one who until recently was beneficed in the diocese of Durham, I yield to none either in my personal affection for Dr Henson or in my sincere appreciation of the independence of his judgment and the courage which leads him to a frank elucidation of his own attitude in the interests of truth.

Readers of the Charge will not fail to notice a difference of temper in the two sections. The former, which deals trenchantly with problems of parochial work, is marked by a statesmanlike tolerance and breadth of view, which should commend it to Churchmen of all schools. In the latter the atmosphere is wholly different. The criticism of Copec, while not seldom penetrating, and so far of admitted value, betrays throughout no single trace of sympathy or appreciation. But no movement, least of all a movement of the scope and character of Copec, which reckons among its supporters thousands of sincere and instructed Christians, can be fairly or helpfully criticized unless in the mind of the critic himself there is at least some measure of these two essential qualities. One who had learned about

[1] *Quo Tendimus?* Primary Charge delivered at his Visitation to the Clergy of his Diocese in November, 1924, by Herbert Hensley Henson, D.D., Lord Bishop of Durham. (Hodder and Stoughton.)

Copec for the first time by a perusal of the Bishop's Charge would be left with the impression that the personnel of the Conference consisted of a heterogeneous collection of unbalanced enthusiasts, persons altogether ignorant of the real nature of the problems which they presumed to discuss, approaching those problems in a spirit either of blithe irresponsibility or of smug self-righteousness; persons, moreover, by no means free from the temper of the sycophant in their attitude towards the 'masses,' feverishly anxious to conceal the poverty of their mental equipment by the glib profession of 'a plenary sense of inspired confidence.'

It is perhaps not without significance that long before the meeting of the Conference Dr. Henson had determined in his own mind what would be the character and temper of its discussions. The leaders were branded in advance as 'perfervid zealots,' while the rank and file were characterized as people of little emotional stability likely to be carried away by floods of irresponsible oratory. Now without doubt men tend to find what they look for, and one cannot but feel that many of the Bishop's strictures apply rather to his own imaginary picture of Copec than to Copec as it actually was. The Reports, at any rate, are anything but florid. Heavy possibly, long-winded perhaps, mistaken it may be in this judgment or in that, but florid, no! And Dr. Henson himself admits that the Reports indicate 'inquiry, knowledge, weighing of evidence,' so that they, it must be supposed, are not the main cause of his dissatisfaction.

But this admission with regard to the Reports is significant, for to a large extent it discounts the criticism of the Conference as a whole. The primary purpose of the Conference was the discussion of the Reports. The delegates had read the Reports before assembling. Those responsible for their composition were present to speak about them, to offer explanations, and to meet criticisms. Oratory, whether the term be used in appreciation or reproach, was, in point of fact, little heard. Large as the Conference was, to brand its members as a crowd of emotional persons willing to vote unthinkingly for any number of ill-considered resolutions, would be manifestly unfair. True, there were times of emotional tension, though such times were remarkably rare. It may be admitted also that on more than one

occasion majorities in favour of a particular resolution were unexpectedly large. But even so, the opposition was always effectively vocal, and however many the ways in which Copec may legitimately be described, the atmosphere was certainly not that of 'an excited public meeting,' nor had the delegates anything in common with Gilbert's M.P.s in *Iolanthe*, who have 'to leave their brains outside, and vote just as their leaders tell 'em to.'

We pass now to a more serious and definite charge, that of Copec's 'irresponsibility.' Dr. Henson writes (p. 95): 'Copec was of course altogether irresponsible; and therefore free to indulge the luxury of programme-framing without reference to those obstinate facts which a responsible statesman . . . must needs consider.' And the implication is plain that had the Conference been actually endowed with legislative powers, or had there been any real risk to the pockets of delegates themselves in consequence of their reforming ardour, the resolutions would have been differently worded.

Now a charge of this kind against a great Conference is as easy to make as it is difficult to substantiate. Irresponsible programme-framing is not unknown, benevolence which costs nothing was as familiar to St. James as it is to us. But the logic of Dr. Henson's contention is worth noting. Would he, during the years of the Industrial Revolution, have asserted that factory owners were the only people in a position to discuss impartially the legitimacy of child labour because they stood to lose most heavily by any change in the customary system? Surely a Christian, without claiming to possess expert knowledge on all questions connected with the successful running of a factory, had the right to maintain that certain conditions were intolerable, and that if the industry could not be supported except under those conditions, then such an industry must be terminated forthwith. *Mutatis mutandis* the same must hold true to-day, nor in condemning flagrant abuses as alike unnecessary in practice and without theoretical justification ought a man to incur the charge either of irresponsible programme-framing or of failure to count the personal cost of reform.

We are naturally led at this point to the consideration of the Bishop's second indictment, that of Copec's undue reliance

upon divine guidance. 'The orators,' we are assured, 'seemed to oscillate between the oracular pronouncements of the prophet, and the argued reasonings of the student' (p. 80), and again, 'Much language was used in the Conference which . . . suggests that the members were relying rather on supernatural inspiration than on merely human effort' (p. 81). Now obviously, any claim to inspiration lays those who make it open to ready misunderstanding. What to one may appear as an utterance of inspired intuition, another may regard merely as evidence of cocksureness and conceit. Many who were not present at the Lambeth Conference of 1920 felt not a little impatient at what seemed to them an over-confident assumption of providential leading. Perhaps only those actually on the spot, whether at Lambeth or at Birmingham, can speak helpfully of the inspiration vouchsafed to the delegates. To be correctly gauged, must not an atmosphere be actually experienced? But be that as it may, the charge of oscillation between the contradictory rolls of prophet and of student seems scarcely justified. Detailed study of a great problem cannot rightly be held to detract from the student's power of prophetic utterance, nor may we assert that the determination 'to hear God speak' indicates any aversion from the more pedestrian methods of exact research.

But it will be asked: 'What in point of fact are the precise limits within which the claim of the Christian conscience to give authoritative judgments can be rightly allowed?' It is precisely on this question that Dr. Henson finds himself in marked disagreement with the promoters of Copec. Without doubt allegiance to Jesus Christ is not tantamount to virtual omniscience, nor may we assume that every genuine Christian will of necessity attach himself to the same political party in the State. On the other hand, it may surely be asserted without cant that the clearer a man's understanding of the mind of Christ, the truer will be his vision of the divine purpose for the world, and the more penetrating his condemnation of ways and conditions which are incompatible with its accomplishment. Needless to say, Copec made no claim to infallibility. But when men and women meet together, doubly equipped as were the Copec delegates with a sound knowledge of facts and a sincere desire both

to think and to act in accordance with the truth of things, the results of their meeting must surely merit the sympathetic consideration of all men of goodwill.

We reach now the head and front of Dr. Henson's attack. Not only does he assert the irresponsibility of the delegates, not only does he question the claim of Christians to rely upon the guidance of the Spirit in their approach to 'secular' problems, but he roundly denies the legitimacy of the Basis upon which the whole structure of Copec has been erected. And it need scarcely be said that if this denial is justified, *cadit quaestio*, Copec ought never to have been held, and those who welcomed its coming and who are working for its ideals have gone seriously astray, since the principles and policy for which it stands are not properly Christian at all.

Dr. Henson finds the origin of Copec in the spirit of despondency and discontent produced by the war. And we are assured that the insistent demand for 'Reconstruction' was itself little more than one expression of 'the hungry secularism which swept over the nation on the morrow of victory' (p. 76) and which set at nought the essentially 'other-worldly' aspect of Christianity. The point of view here expressed is not of course unfamiliar, yet can we accept it as embodying a just estimate of the after-war temper? Discontent of a healthy type there certainly was, but ought we to speak of despondency as markedly characteristic of the Reconstruction period? It was rather idealism, of a kind somewhat deficient perhaps in sober caution, which appeared to dominate our thinking during the months which followed the Armistice. And to speak of 'hungry secularism' as the master-motive of reconstruction is surely an error. Was it not rather a new appreciation of the essentially sacramental character of the Christian outlook on life which gave vitality and power to the efforts after a better world? One cannot but notice that the Bishop deals rather hardly with the war chaplains, describing them as men 'who had carried abroad with them more enthusiasm than experience, and brought back with them more discontent than wisdom' (p. 77). Yet many who never left England during the war thank God for the clearer vision, the surer contact with reality, the truer sense of proportion which the chaplains have given to the Church of the present day. And if these men are in part responsible for the

emergence of Copec, the fact should surely make us more and not less inclined to view its ideals with sympathy, if not with positive approval.

But to return to the Copec Basis, which by asserting 'that the social ethics of Christianity have been greatly neglected by Christians with disastrous consequences to the individual and to society,' 'inverts,' so Dr. Henson tells us (p. 85), 'the evangelical order of reformation' by placing the transformation of the individual second instead of first. To this accusation we can only respectfully reply that the Basis does nothing of the kind. The evil results for the individual of a bad environment are, as a matter of fact, first mentioned. But in strictness the question of priority is here irrelevant. Individual and social salvation are not antagonistic ideals, but complementary processes. Nor may we rightly say of them that they are two objectives (both desirable in themselves) to be gained in isolation, first A. and then B. Rather are they parallel goals of Christian ambition, to be achieved concurrently, if achieved at all. It is not the purpose of Copec to compel non-Christian individuals to become members of a Christian order of society against their will, but rather to help individual Christians to think out and to act upon the social implications of their personal creed. And Copec would claim that the teaching of Jesus contains certain fundamental principles which are capable of detailed application to the varied problems of modern life.

But this claim, too, Dr. Henson appears to repudiate. True, he can say, 'We shall all agree that in the teaching of Jesus Christ is contained the secret of society's regeneration' (p. 87). Yet he would have us believe that 'it is misleading to suggest that in the Gospel we shall find a complete answer to the questions which are now pressing on us' (p. 88), since 'the fundamental principles which Copec emphasizes do not really cover the whole ground which must be covered if the problems which confront the statesman and the economist are to find solution' (p. 88). In so speaking Dr. Henson is 'acutely conscious' that he will be misunderstood. Yet surely the words can convey only one of two meanings. Either they must be taken to mean that the New Testament does not contain cut-and-dried schemes of political and economic reform, ready-made answers to every conceivable modern problem held to be rigidly binding upon all

Christians—an assertion too obvious to require serious consideration, or they must be taken to mean that there are in fact whole spheres of human life and activity within which the mind and spirit of Jesus Christ have no proper jurisdiction. Such indeed would appear to be the Bishop's belief, for he writes (p. 88), 'Within its own sphere the New Testament is supreme, but there are other spheres in which the attempt to assert its supremacy can only lead to disaster.'

Now it is precisely this departmental outlook which Copec deplores. And when Dr. Henson asserts that 'Christianity is part, a vital part, of a larger thing' (p. 88), we are compelled once more to disagree. Christianity is emphatically not 'a part' of anything. It is rather a spirit, an outlook, a scale of values, an estimate of God, Man and the meaning of existence, by which the individual's attitude to all so-called secular problems, from the simplest to the most complex, is regulated at every turn.

We are warned, indeed, that the Christian principle of the Fatherhood of God must not lead us to ignore the patent fact of human inequality, or to despise what might appear to be merely mundane questions of race and stock. But what educated Christian would seek for a moment to maintain the unimportance of these things? Certainly no supporter of Copec. Let a man read, for example, Dr. Oldham's great book, *Christianity and the Race Problem*, and he will no longer hesitate to accept either 'the Fact of Inequality' or 'the Fact of Equality' as these are presented to him in consecutive chapters. And yet Dr. Oldham himself, whom assuredly none will accuse of minimizing the value of scientific inquiry, is a convinced adherent of the Copec cause. We cannot accept Dr. Henson's plea for 'some wider basis than the "fundamental principles" of the New Testament' (p. 94).

Once again, Copec is charged with pursuing two aims which stand in mutual contradiction, of seeking on the one hand to ameliorate the conditions of the majority by a great expenditure of public money, while at the same time killing the goose which lays the golden eggs by a determined effort to bring the present system of industry to an abrupt conclusion. It is difficult to accept the foregoing summary as a fair statement of the attitude of the Conference. Poverty, it was indeed asserted, was both unnecessary and removable, given the necessary determination

to remove it. But the emphasis of Reports and speeches fell less upon the need of a drastic alteration in the system of industry regarded as a machine, than upon the urgent necessity of a change of heart, of ideal and of motive in many who control the machinery of industry at the present time. To imply, as Dr. Henson would seem to do (p. 98), that without the motive of unlimited acquisitiveness any system of industry, however organized, must fail inevitably to produce the wealth required for its own continuance, is surely to display a temper dangerously cynical, an outlook devoid of those elements of sane optimism which one who believes in God as Jesus depicted Him may rightly be expected to possess.

We are assured, however, that the critics of the present system are so obsessed with its darker features that they are not in a position to judge fairly of its positive achievements. And in some cases, no doubt, the contention may be allowed. But the further claim, enunciated with complete confidence, that while in Jesus Christ we have the perfect model of human goodness for the *individual*, in the matter of *social* conduct men are left without any sure guidance, is surely altogether without foundation. How can we view the ideal individual apart from the social environment to which he belongs, and into relations with which he must inevitably enter at every moment of his life? Given the model of individual perfection, can it be seriously maintained that we are wholly without knowledge of the nature of that ideal order of society for which Copec is working? (p. 108).

Finally, we cannot regard without misgiving Dr. Henson's stress on the Christian's power of sublime mastery over even the worst possible conditions of human living. Doubtless we are here in the presence of a great truth, which requires emphasis (p. 117). But because St. Paul, in the somewhat peculiar conditions existing in the early Church, could counsel a high-hearted indifference to existing disabilities, it would be hazardous to assume that Wilberforce, let us say, would have been well advised, instead of working unremittingly for the emancipation of the slave, to counsel a patient acceptance of the *status quo*. Christian resignation may be an admirable virtue when practised in one's own case, but to recommend it to others who are labouring, it may be, under a crushing burden of great and un-

necessary wrongs, is surely a course beset with dangers to him who follows it.

But when all is said, drastic as the Bishop's criticisms of Copec undoubtedly are, and sharply as many of his friends will differ from him on a number of important issues, it may still be maintained that Dr. Henson and the leaders of Copec are in reality much nearer together than is at present recognized by either side. For towards the close of his Charge he tells us (p. 121) that men of necessity make three main demands upon their religion, 'that it shall provide them with a tolerable explanation of the Riddle of Existence; that it shall give them a sufficient version of duty: and that it shall bring to them strength to fulfil the obligations which perforce they acknowledge.' Could the truth have been put with more telling cogency? It is precisely these three demands which, in the opinion of the Copec 'enthusiast,' Christianity can triumphantly satisfy. Christ's answer to the Riddle of Existence is a loving God, His version of duty is that men shall seek to carry out the purposes of love in all the complex network of human relationships, and to those who with humility of heart desire to accept for themselves so exacting an obligation, He gives the power to transform the impossible into the inevitable through the medium of uncalculating service rendered in loyalty to Him.

THE PHILOSOPHIC APPROACH TO RELIGION

By T. S. Jessop, M.A., B.Litt.

I. *The Nature of Philosophy.*

IT is the fate of everything esoteric to be misunderstood by the uninitiated. The natural man has a profound distrust of all restricted and select societies, and this elementary suspicion is extended to those refinements of thought which, not being susceptible of transparently clear apprehension without prolonged specialized training, seem to be necessarily the prerogative of a small and privileged class. Now suspicion is the great distorter of the human mind, the cloud that darkens the understanding and quenches that strong sympathy which alone

sustains the patient consideration of unfamiliar ways of life or thought. It is not surprising, therefore, that philosophy, the reserve of peculiar and aristocratic ideas, has been widely misunderstood. By one of those seeming paradoxes that meet us at almost every turn, the distrust has been deepest, and has often passed through misunderstanding into active hostility, in the camp of religion, where of all places breadth of sympathy might fairly be expected. For many religious people philosophy is the mother of heresy, the champion of impiety, and the refrigerator of the soul. To remove this misunderstanding (which very few of the great Fathers of the Church have fallen into), to state, under severe limitations of space, the relation in which philosophy stands to religion, is the task of the present paper.

What, then, is philosophy? A formal definition might be unintelligible, or, if intelligible, uninstructive. In any case it would be all but useless for our purpose. It will be more profitable to avoid the barren pursuit of a controversial topic, and instead point to one or two features that characterize the great historic systems admittedly called philosophic.

Philosophy is, as Plato and Aristotle, slipping into poetry, remarked, the child of wonder or of serious curiosity. It is the most determined expression of the demand to know. Now the demand to know is whetted by every crumb of satisfaction it receives. Every solution is found to be big with fresh problems, every charted spot continuous with an unknown and ever receding hinterland. Thought is led onwards and outwards by an irresistible impulsion, or, more strictly, by an impulsion which can be resisted only by expediency, by superficiality, by laziness—or by fear. Hence it is that philosophy is universal in its scope, the most comprehensive of all the disciplines. The sciences, once few and wide, have divided and subdivided and divided yet again, so that to each is left only a relatively tiny province or abstract aspect of the world. To restore the sundered universe to its wholeness, to stand back and take the broad synoptic view, is the task of philosophy; and the increase of scientific specialization makes such synthesis more and more necessary, although, of course, more and more difficult.

From this very comprehensiveness springs the critical nature of philosophy. So long as statements and theories stand

in isolation, they possess a meretricious plausibility. It is only when two or more statements are brought together that error or disproportionate emphasis is made apparent, and the subtlest errors—the half-truths that do so much to muddle thought and poison life—are revealed only in the light of unusually wide and careful comparisons. It is evident, therefore, that, unless we are content to acquiesce in contradictions and exaggerations, the very process of synthetic thinking begets criticism. Large surveys make one 'fact' or theory confront another, and lead on to the elimination of discrepant ideas and the correction of distorted ones. Only so do we attain to those magnificent linkages which enable us 'to see life steadily and see it whole.'

Philosophy is at once the supreme and most daring venture of reason, and reason's keenest critic. Apotheosis and disparagement of intellect are both strangely interwoven in its texture. The rational power is exerted to the uttermost, but it may be pressed to exhaustion. A few philosophers have thought that it can go all the way in winning the final world-view and giving man his due orientation towards whatever gods there be; others think that it may go a great deal of the way; while others are convinced that it is useless—though these have to use reason in order to argue its nullity. The point is that reason must be pushed as far as possible, its worth tested by the ultimate limits of its reach. It is important to bear this candour in mind, since philosophy, unpopular because so pertinaciously critical, is the only science which is through and through and essentially *self*-critical. It alone examines its assumptions. This is perhaps the best way of bringing out what many of us regard as its finest feature—the cult of truth even at the cost of its own dissolution, so rigid an adherence to the law of intellectual sincerity that it is prepared, if need be, candidly to pronounce its own futility Initially under the compulsion to be rational, it may end in the denial of reason as an adequate guide to the general structure and purpose of reality; though even here it would be triumphant in its very failure, itself the victor that wrought the defeat, for rationalism would then succumb to a *rational* disproof. The bicentenary of the birth of Kant reminds us of a remarkable instance of such a Pyrrhic victory.

In brief, then, philosophy is the most persistent attempt to comprehend the sum and substance of reality; it is thought

in the grandest exercise of its activity. Cherishing for itself the exacting code of perfect intellectual honour, it is necessarily critical, but equally necessarily self-critical. Thought is moved to the interrogation of itself. And when we consider it in reference to the ideal of demonstrated impregnable knowledge that it sets before itself, philosophical activity may be viewed as intellect in life or death struggle with itself; in watching the shaping of a metaphysical system we witness a momentously significant drama.

This is, of course, the ideal conception. Inasmuch as philosophers are also men, their loyalty to this ideal is imperfect. We all halt and blunder. But the ideal remains, and by its ideal philosophy must be judged and placed in its relation to the other manifestations of the strivings of the human spirit.

II. *The Approach to Religion.*

How does the philosopher come to consider religion? For what reason has he to discuss the nature of Deity? The answer is implicit in what has gone before. A scheme of thought which embraces the totality of things is not only called upon to place each part or aspect in its proper relation to the other parts or aspects, and to estimate their relative functions and values; it is also required to attempt an explanation of the whole *as a whole*. Besides effecting a synthesis, it must make the synthesis intelligible. The thread that runs through and unites the infinite aggregation of things, the ultimate principle that sheds on the whole the grand illumination of a single meaning, is the goal of all serious philosophy; and such a principle, hypostatized—considered not as a mere principle but as an actually existent fact—is, in the language of religion, God. The last questions have to be asked: Is there a universe at all in the strict sense of the term, that is, a unitary system within which everything falls? and if so, what is the nature of the unity and of its cause? Philosophy being above all the asking of ultimate questions (whether it is the answering of them is a matter of debate), in so far as it proposes to itself the questions just mentioned, coincides with Natural Theology. Theology was Aristotle's name for metaphysics. For those questions may be restated in the

form: Is there a God? and if so, what is His purpose and wha His nature? That is how philosophy comes into contact wit religion.

In order of time the first step was taken by contemplatio of the physical world. Here the conquests of science have bee conspicuously large. The rhythmic play of metabolic chang that constitutes the bodily life of living creatures has bee found to include processes already familiar in the chemica study of inanimate bodies. Gold, wood, stone and clay hav been reduced to common terms. The coherence of the sola system, the ebb and flow of the tides, and the fall of an apple are all explained by the one principle of gravitation. So far a our observation extends, the realm of physical nature appear to be a single system, with a fundamental identity of stuff an law. Bit by bit gaps in the scheme are being filled, the affinit of apparently dissimilar things being discovered, and an amaz ing harmony of activity being brought to light. The statute book of science grows more and more into the similitude of clear-cut rational code of laws. Science, indeed, rests on th assumption that the world is, in part at least, rational. Onl because of that assumption did science come into being, an only by retaining it can it continue to be. It is not a whim. I was suggested by the recurring uniformities which force them selves in ever-increasing number and interconnectedness a reflection becomes more interested in them. The human mind responding to these frequent suggestions of order, formulate hypotheses and, emboldened by their progressive verification extends them further, turns its scrutiny into new fields whic again communicate the same suggestion of regularity and inter connection, and rejoices at the almost ubiquitous confirmatio of its initial and guiding presupposition.

When the philosopher, pursuing the direction thus indicate and anticipating in some measure the results of future scientifi research, tries to proceed to the final synthesis and simplifica tion, he observes that law and intelligibility are the same caprice defies knowledge. This leads him to ask a question Does not intelligibility imply intelligence, rationality bespea reason? and since intelligence or reason cannot be conceive without a mind that exercises it, are we not driven to suppos that the existence of order in the physical world involves th

existence of a dominating mind? If so, philosophy has come almost within sight of the city of God. Some thinkers would deny this conclusion; they find it possible to conceive that a mighty mechanism can be entirely self-governing. But the question has to be raised, however it be answered, and the raising of it is one approach of philosophy to religion.

There is, however, another realm of being, the realm of mind. The mathematical formulae of quantitative equivalences, the law of gravitation, the principle of chemical affinity, are extraneous to it. Physiology—the study of the laws of animal and vegetable life as manifested in the functioning of organs—has some reference to it, yet the life of spirit and the life of body differ vastly. When we come to mind we are introduced to an entirely new set of phenomena—thoughts and feelings, vague longings and clearly defined ideals, the conscious pursuit of purposes, the whole deep and intricate complex of varied stirrings whose manifold phases form the fugitive ripples, turbulent billows, and lingering calms of your experience and mine. How is this world of mind to be explained? Several alternatives may be canvassed. Possibly it is all a hectic froth thrown up by the chance union of atoms in a certain way. If this purports to be a scientific account, it belies its pretensions: science arose and persists as a protest against the use of chance as a principle of explanation. For the same reason it is not open to the scientist to say that mind is an accidental by-product in the later stages of animal evolution, a casual secretion of nervous processes of a certain degree of complexity. It would seem as though the emergence of mind can be accounted for only by something itself mental, perhaps by the spiritual principle suggested by the physical world. If not, or if there be no such spiritual principle anywhere at all, we appear to have on our hands the very thing that those who incline to the purely materialistic mode of explanation abhor—namely, a miracle. For that a collocation of atoms or a union of energetic forces, essentially destitute of mental characteristics or of higher control, should produce beings that can see visions and express them in language or carve them in stone, understand and exploit their environment (not to mention one another), awake to honour and morals, and believe in gods, is a miracle among miracles. It is not even capable of clear conception. The

miracle of grace is at least conceivable, and, indeed, to man as obvious as the noonday sun. No, when a man begins to ex plain himself away, or to make himself a grotesque anomaly : a whirl of atoms, we must suspect something wrong in his 'ex planation.' Froth could not discover its own frothiness. Scienc cannot accept conclusions which rule out the possibility o science. By taking away all reason from the world from whic he supposes himself to be derived, man either condemns hi own reason by which he has arrived at that conclusion, and s contradicts himself, or else gives it a unique position, in whic case he simply states again the problem from which he started In other words, in the latter instance he has mistaken the en of his inquiry for the solution of his problem; in the forme case he has stultified himself, for all thinking annuls itself whe the thinker thinks away the possibility of there being any think ing at all. The question becomes inexpressibly acute whe considered with further reference to moral and religious exper ence, when ideals and values, worship and social obligations besides the activities of reason, are involved. It seems to m that the fact of God must be admitted to redeem the spiritua life from nonsense as well as from tragedy. But here again am giving one answer to the problem. My primary purpos was to show that there *is* a problem, and that by including within his purview the philosopher makes another approach t religion. Incidentally I have tried to show that certain pre tended solutions of an anti-religious kind make the proble more acute than ever. Perhaps, too, I may have illustrate Bacon's dictum: 'A little philosophy inclineth the mind t atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's mind about t religion.'

I have greatly simplified the situation by selecting two o the most obvious ways of approach. The bringing together o the ultimate principle in Nature and the ultimate principle i the spiritual order into a final synthesis is a further step. Th philosophical study of history with a view to detecting the dri and goal and moving force of human development is anothe line of approach; and yet another is the direct examination o the claims of religious experience to be in communion with th source and end of all existence. These avenues can only b mentioned here.

III. *The Value of Philosophy for Religion.*

As for the critical attitude of philosophy, I trust something has been said to mollify a deep-seated prejudice. It would be interesting to embark on a fuller discussion to justify in some detail certain criticisms which have been brought to bear on traditional Christian theology, and in this way to illustrate the function of all sound criticism whatever—to clarify obscurities, remove discrepancies, and correct misplaced emphasis. Criticism is salutary; it is the offset of fanaticism, not the enemy of sincerity. It is the assertion of reason to have at least some dignified share in the economy of man's life. In a rich personality *every* part functions. This is not intellectualism; it is simply the recognition that the latest capacity developed by man in his upward struggles should be permitted to play its finer rôle. Intellect long ago outran its purely biological value.

While thus insisting on the prominence of criticism, I should misrepresent the spirit of philosophy were I not to insist equally on the impartiality of its criticism. It is no respecter of persons. If at times it embarrasses the religious man by posing awkward questions, it turns its rapier equally against those who would dismiss religion lightly. It is owing to the steady pressure of philosophic criticism during the last sixty years that materialism has ceased to be an influential or even a respectable *theoretical* attitude. By the same instrumentality agnosticism, so fashionable fifty years ago, has lost prestige; and scepticism in any very general form has long been shown to be untenable.

In this defensive service we see one respect in which philosophy has immense value for religion. Purely in the interests of truth it has scrutinised and condemned many theories which run counter to any kind of belief in God or in the cosmic warrant of our ideals. The fatal flaw in these atheistic systems usually is that they fail to consider, still less to explain, some important aspect of experience. The thinker who tries to reduce everything to matter mechanically determined, or who claims to show that man is simply a higher animal explicable in purely biological terms, is guilty of extending a system of ideas and principles which have been found to work in one sphere, into another sphere, without subjecting them here to that detailed and rigid testing which they had to undergo there. The phy-

sicist who has mastered the structure and motions of dea matter has no right to carry forward his conclusions withou modification into the realm of living organisms; and the bio logist, similarly, cannot lay down the laws of mind until he ha become a psychologist as well as a biologist. By checking ras generalizations and pointing out that an hypothesis verified wit reference to one set of facts is true only within those limits the philosopher acts as a defender against illegitimate en croachments. He insists that each department of being shoul be studied by means of ideas and methods appropriate to i instead of being approached by and uncritically subjected to stock of notions and laws conceived in the study of a very dif ferent subject-matter. This means that religion cannot be rule out in advance by prejudices derived from an exclusive stud of other fields. Religious experience has a certain autonomy is entitled, like any other part of experience, to a specialize examination, in order that it might reveal its nature faithfull through the medium of a system of descriptive terms and ex planatory laws expressly suggested by and designed for itself What the lyric poet sings, then, and the mute mystic sees, ar data for the psychologist, who will render them articulate i scientific but congenial terms and search out their implications The results thus obtained have, of course, to be brought b philosophy into connection with the results of scientific inquir in other fields, and may perhaps be modified in the light o the general view, but that general view will be one to whic religious experience has made its contribution. It is scarcel possible to emphasize too strongly the protection given in thi way by philosophy to religion. Whatever be the final verdict religious experience will have had its say. Against all attempt to explain the spiritual life of man by alien concepts which have not been worked out or verified within that sphere, philosophy is committed by its very nature to protest. Concerned as it i with the whole circle of reality, it must perforce stand out a the guardian of neglected aspects, the rectifier of lopsidedness It may not be amiss to point out in passing that whenever we try to build a universal theory of the origin and nature of the world on the basis of religious experience alone—and the appea to revelation rests in the end on this—disdainful of the fact ascertained by the sciences, philosophy, by virtue of the impar

tiality I have just described, will turn round upon us and shatter our pompous pretensions. Of the error of which we rightly convict our opponents, we are ourselves by no means innocent: it is the cause of almost every collision between philosophy and religion.

So far I have confined myself to philosophy as it is in the hands of the purely speculative thinker. As an instrument in the hands of the reflective and earnest devotee of religion it is invaluable.

At a time like the present, when winds of doctrine blow simultaneously from the four quarters of the globe and old beliefs are being whirled away like chaff, mind and heart alike crave for some sanctuary built on a foundation of rock. It is possible to secure a cheap immunity from doubt by closing one's mind to current questions and fastening one's faith blindly on the traditions of the fathers, but only by doing violence to our nature. The stifling of a part carries with it the stunting of the whole. 'To live is to use reason,' says Dante in his *Convivio*, 'and to abandon the use of reason is to abandon human existence, and thus to be dead.' If we honour truth and value the power we possess to discover it, we shall think hard, and to think hard about religion is inevitably to philosophize. Only so shall we be able to disperse painful confusion, rise above the babel of incoherent and fearful questionings to the clear and confident grasp of certain truths refined in the fire and therefore embraced by every potency of the soul. Deep reflection supervening upon experience consolidates almost beyond shaking those convictions which survive examination, and the resultant state of mind is a serene harmony. Is it a small gain after the agony of thought to have risen to a higher repose? when

> . . . that in us which thinks with that which feels
> Shall everlastingly be reconciled;
> And that which questioneth with that which kneels.

This is the only honourable peace of mind, the only warrant for those who would repeat the gesture of Luther: 'Here stand I; I can no other.'

IV. *The Limitations of Philosophy.*

As a weapon of defence, then, as an aid to spiritual stability, and as an instrument of evangelical persuasion, philosophy is

of incalculable worth. It has, however, certain limitations. Philosophy is long and slow, life is short and swift, full of terrible urgencies which compel immediate self-committal to one view or another of ultimate things. Theory always lags behind the exigencies of practical living. It is because we have to cleave to views for which the full evidence has not yet been given that the Greek ideal of a life lived in accordance with reason is not entirely realizable. Intuition, taste, instinct assist the shortcomings of knowledge, and also cover the angular skeleton with the softening and enchanting habiliments of poetry.

It is of the very essence of a religious philosophy that, however thoroughly and orderly it may be thought out, there is always a gap that can be filled, a margin of unrationalized content that can be clarified, only by the moral or spiritual sense. Without faith, without risk, religion would lose its character and resolve itself into prudence of the most commonplace kind. But in a great religion the final appeal is to spiritual heroism, the last word is 'Follow me,' a claim that goes beyond what has been completely proved, a claim whose verification is unalterably practical, and therefore possible only after the call has first been accepted with a brave heart and put to the experiential test. Obloquy may have to be incurred, or martyred blood spilled, before the serious student of life's mysteries can inscribe, for himself and for posterity, the triumphant conclusion : *quod erat demonstrandum.*

Philosophy, then, is not itself religion. It can help to put us in the position to see, but it cannot make us see. It can formulate the truths of religion, but it can neither prove them all nor make us live any of them out. Philosophy is thinking with every resource of the whole personality; religion is living to the highest level of our thoughts, and to the higher level of our most penetrating intuitions. The final vision of religious truth is inevitably mystical, and the living of it out essentially practical. Philosophy, being only a theoretical activity, here stops short, but not without having led many pilgrims along sure paths to the outer court of the Temple.

BISHOP GORE AS A CHRISTIAN APOLOGIST.[1]—II

By the Rev. J. S. Bezzant, B.A., Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

V.

We have seen that Bishop Gore holds very strongly that the Roman Catholic claim to authority in matters of belief is an unwarrantable extension and even a perversion of the moderate character and limited scope of such authority as it appears in the New Testament. At the same time he maintains that 'the religion of Christ is in its very essence an authoritative religion based upon the Word of God, and the Church is authoritative because it is the commissioned carrier of the message' (p. 162). Again, 'There is something infallible in the Church, which is the original Gospel, proclaimed by the Apostles, and recorded in the New Testament' (p. 199). To this, though she must defend it and explicate its meaning, the Church cannot add. But when we ask what exactly is this divinely authoritative message of God which is infallible, we are met with much deplorable vagueness in the reply. Although this may be regarded as proof of Bishop Gore's careful honesty, it weakens our confidence in his repeated assertions that there is a message which can correctly be so described. Thus 'the Old Testament *is* not the word of God in the sense that everything there narrated is historically correct, or that we can isolate any particular text and say, "This is an infallible utterance of God," but it *conveys to us*, in a variety of books of different kinds, one moral and spiritual message, really inspired by the Spirit of God' (p. 256*f*). And Dr. Gore protests against any assertion that his criticism of the New Testament is less free than that of the Old (p. 267), for 'it is fatal for the Church to claim to restrict the sphere of historical criticism.' He asserts that our Lord's knowledge shows no signs of transcending that of His age and 'it cannot fairly be urged that our Lord fixed upon us

[1] *The Holy Spirit and the Church*, by Charles Gore, D.D., formerly Bishop of Oxford. (London: John Murray, 1924. Price 7/6 nett.)

whether about nature, or about Jewish literature, the yoke of first century knowledge' (p. 258). 'The only teaching He gave, and gave with the note of infallible certitude, was drawn from a profounder and eternal source' (p. 258). Nevertheless, on the crucial question as to whether we may say of any text of the New Testament, 'This is an infallible utterance of God,' Dr. Gore is silent. We should deduce that his answer would be negative, but he does not give one. Of Scripture generally he writes, 'The record of the divine message is given in a literature which contains historical records of very different historical values and of a quasi-scientific character which are not according to the facts as we know them. The word of God is infallible, but you cannot call the books which convey it to us infallible without disaster' (p. 205). But how then can fallible human reason, of however many individuals, ever infallibly extract the infallible word of God from the fallible records in which it is contained? Dr. Gore tells us that the function of the Church is to convey the message of God which is infallible, and yet he urges that the Church's decisions about her message must always be brought to the test of Scripture. In other words, that the Church has ever unearthed this infallible word from the fallible records can only be proved by bringing the infallible word to the test of the same fallible records. Even if we ignore the obvious question, 'Who is to apply the test?' the argument appears to be somewhat circular. And it is really much worse. For in what sense can it be claimed that Christ gave, even to the whole Church, any authority to pronounce infallibly upon teaching, none of which was in written form during His lifetime, and much of which was not even given till many years later? We can get no clear guidance from Bishop Gore here. Of the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils, he tells us that we can rely on them with 'a whole-hearted confidence,' and with the same confidence which inspired the first Church of Jerusalem to say, 'It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us.' Indeed, Dr. Gore deprecates the desire for any other kind of infallibility. But how then can we reach that message of God which is infallible? With the deepest respect, we feel bound to say we can see little meaning in Dr. Gore's concluding remark upon this subject. In view of the facts of history, he urges

caution in talking about the infallibility of the Church and adds, 'Christ is the truth, and the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Jesus and the Spirit of truth and infallible. And because He is in the Church there is something there infallible. But indefectibility and God-given authority are, in general, better words to use concerning the Church' (p. 206). We hope we are not unjust to Dr. Gore if we say of the infallible word of God, the final authority of which he stresses so heavily and so frequently, that he fails to tell us either what it is or how it may be found. It is hardly satisfactory to be told that what we can most rely upon are precisely those Conciliar Definitions which Dr. Gore elsewhere describes as a regrettable necessity and as 'primarily negative.'[2]

And many will find it difficult to justify the language in which Dr. Gore speaks of the General Councils. Can we honestly say that the assembled Fathers 'squarely faced a question definitely raised,' and that they 'definitely answered it after full consideration,' if these words are intended to bear their meaning to modern ears? And if 'the first five centuries were days of general enlightenment and there was a multitude of Church teachers and an intelligent public,' though this may in a sense be true, there was nevertheless an entire absence of criticism in many matters which are of vital importance to us, and to the problems concerned. It may be true that 'for three centuries or longer' the Church maintained its career 'in marked distinction from the world or the State' (p. 315) and that during these 'pure centuries' 'the current of Church life and teaching were running substantially distinct' (p. 315). But the dogmatic decisions do not belong to these centuries, but to the later time of which Bishop Gore elsewhere writes, 'The theological confusion was appalling, and the decisions of bishops in Council were bewildering in their contradictions; and indeed the bishops seemed to have lost all steadfastness and to bend before the contrary winds of imperial tempers; and there were rival bishops in a number of sees; and an insufferable strife of tongues' (p. 227). If we mistake not, it is because Bishop Gore personally approves the Conciliar decisions that 'in spite of the disagreeable moral impression which some of the Councils leave

[2] See p. 241. Cf. *Belief in Christ.*

upon our minds' (p. 206), he feels his claim for their pr eminent authority to be justified.

VI.

We hope that Dr. Gore may yet find time to reply in deta to Dr. Rashdall's criticisms of the Chalcedonian Christolog and of Dr. Gore's exposition of it.[3] Meanwhile, in the prese volume, there is a long note on the Definition of Chalcedo which has been called forth by Dr. H. R. Mackintosh's *Th Person of Jesus Christ*, which Bishop Gore says he had not rea when he wrote *Belief in Christ*. We regret to say we find th new exposition less satisfactory than that in Dr. Gore's earli volume. Dr. Mackintosh finds the essence of personality will, and says, 'It is enough that Christ should be one with Go in will.' He is also of opinion that in treating Christology, th category of personality, or of will, is highly preferable to th category of 'substance.' Bishop Gore protests vigorously an is sure that any feeling that 'substance' has undesirable co notations in this connexion is really inseparably connected wi Hegelian pantheism. But we need not quarrel with his pl that 'substance' meant and should mean no more than 're thing.' So he says that if we speak of Christ as 'of one su stance with the Father,' this means that He is of that 're thing' that God is; also, if Christ is 'of one substance with us we mean that He took the real being of man and is 'that re thing in all respects that a man is' (p. 234). *Hypostasis* or pe son, he says, was only 'a sub-division of substance' or 'a nam for a special kind of substance' (p. 231 *f*), presumably for th kind of 'substance' which is characterized by what we call pe sonality. Moreover Christ, says Bishop Gore, was not on man, but *a* man (p. 238), and that the Church demanded t recognition that the true manhood of Christ, as in all of us, 'li specially in its spirit, reason, and will' (p. 234 *f*). It is th with something like amazement that we read, that when t Second Council wished to express 'all that properly belon to manhood,' *nature* was the best possible word. Surely 'substance' means 'real thing'; if 'person' merely denotes

[3] See the *Modern Churchman* for December, 1921; April, 1922; a July, 1922.

special kind of 'real thing'; and if Christ is that 'real thing in all respects that a man is'—then 'person' is the best possible word for 'all that properly belongs to manhood.' At any rate, Dr. Gore's own words show how futile is the attempt to distinguish human nature from human personality, as though one could possibly exist without the other. If 'nature' is the only word to describe that 'identity of qualities' by which we can distinguish objects which exist in groups, then obviously 'personality' is of the 'nature' of man, seeing that the groups of men are distinguished from other creatures in that they are persons. It comes to this. If, on the one hand, spirit, reason and will constitute personality, and if Christ's manhood and ours consist especially in 'spirit, reason and will,' then it is idle to attempt to distinguish between human nature and human personality in Christ as in ourselves: on the other hand, if the essence or ground of personality (or 'seat' of personality, to use Dr. Gore's own word) is some 'substance' or 'real thing' which *acts through* 'spirit, reason, and will,' and this 'real thing' is divine in the case of Christ, human in the case of man, what is this but sheer Apollinarianism expressed in terms of a quadruple instead of a tripartite psychology? It is even more Apollinarian than Apollinarius, who thought of the divine Logos as the archetype of the human *nous*, whereas Bishop Gore allows no such correspondence between the divine and the human, and does not accept the doctrine of the *Enhypostasia* which would ascribe an eternal humanity to the Logos before His Incarnation. And then Dr. Gore tells us that though we cannot 'realize as from within the experience of Jesus in willing and knowing,' we can be sure that 'here are . . . two wills, or consciousnesses, a divine and a human'; and although 'the will of self-oblation by which He lived and died were more than human,' yet 'the consciousness of Jesus in His human life is the consciousness of the Man: but behind it there is an older consciousness—that of the eternal Son Who has temporarily condescended to act under conditions of a human mind.' To this morass we are led, be it noted, not by the New Testament, or even by the Nicene Creed, but by Dr. Gore's attempt to defend the language of the Definition of Chalcedon.

VII.

We pass to what in Dr. Gore's opinion is 'of faith' for one who would be a loyal member of the Church. The Bishop maintains that the decisions of the first seven General Councils are obligatory on all teachers of the Church, and in a less direct sense upon all her members. In addition, there is a large body of coherent 'articles of faith' which must be believed (p. 293). These include Original Sin, Atonement, Inspiration of Scripture, Baptism, the Eucharist, and five other Sacraments, belief in the Church as a visible society, the visible 'organ of the Holy Spirit and of the living Christ in the world,' which in turn implies belief in a ministry 'proceeding down the generations by succession from the apostolic fount, and taking shape in a hierarchy of bishops, presbyters, and deacons' (p. 300). There is much else. As we contemplate this list of doctrines and remember that what is claimed for them is not only that they are of spiritual value and of practical use, but that they are binding upon all Christians, we are compelled to turn back to the chapter in which Bishop Gore discusses doctrinal development, true and false. There he describes the Roman Church as a one-sided development of Christianity 'in which multitudes of men and women, and those of the best, who would have been surely amongst the most whole-hearted disciples of Jesus, can find no home' (p. 218). Any Church of which this is true 'is thereby marked as a spurious development' (p. 220). Can anyone look on the modern world and on the people who reject Dr. Gore's estimate of what constitutes true Christianity and not feel that his insistence on his list of doctrines as essential is really condemned by the very tests he enunciates? If the Bishop's attitude to these doctrines is maintained, what is the use of urging that the Church 'must be inclusive where Jesus would have been inclusive' (p. 219), or that the root cause of the impotence of the Church in the modern world order is that it 'has lacked mobility,' whereas it needs 'the maximum of positive mobility that is compatible with real continuity' (p. 223)? Dr. Gore's *principles* are ours, but we feel they come near to being destroyed in his application of them.

VIII.

The Resurrection of the Body is one of the articles which Bishop Gore holds to be 'of faith' for a Christian. He writes, 'A group of our Modernists to-day have been pressing us with the prevalence in ecclesiastical writers of the grosser view, endeavouring to claim that it has full Catholic authority, in order to discredit authority altogether. But that is not just' (p. 303). It is Dr. Gore's imputation which is not just. There has been no desire to discredit authority at all. But let that pass. Dr. Gore stresses the existence, side by side with the grosser view, of a more refined interpretation, but he does not tell us that its most brilliant exponent was regarded as a heretic both in East and West. And notwithstanding the Bishop's insistence on the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, his exposition of the form which that doctrine takes in his mind is a matter of some obscurity. St. Paul, who was clearly in error when he wrote, 'We shall not all sleep,' is regarded by Dr. Gore as unquestionably authoritative when in the same chapter (I *Cor.* xv) he writes at length of 'what he would have us understand by the resurrection of the body.' Bishop Gore expounds St. Paul's view of 'the case of those who have died and have been buried and whose bodies have therefore presumably rotted in the grave' in the following words: 'In their case the language he uses does not at all suggest the recollection of material particles but, as in the case of a seed corn, the continuity of a vital principle clothed by God in a new embodiment' (p. 305). There is a certain ambiguity in this language, the elucidation of which is all important if Dr. Gore is to maintain any real distinction between his own and the modernist belief in the Resurrection. *What is* that 'vital principle' which, 'as in the case of the seed corn,' will continue, and which God will clothe 'in a new embodiment'? Is it the mortal body laid in the grave, or something *in* that body, or is it the human ego or personality? We quote two earlier expositions of the Pauline doctrine by Dr. Gore. 'The human soul or spirit is at death separated from the dead body.' The resurrection of the body means 'that we in our same selves shall be re-clothed in a spiritual body which

we shall recognize as our own unchanged selves. Anyway, God will give to each a body as it shall please Him—a spiritual body.'[4] Or again, 'the earlier "natural" bodies were, *to speak in a figure*,[5] the seeds of the spiritual bodies that should be. Death and corruption, while it dissolves the natural body, enables God to give to each his own proper body. This suggests a continuous personal identity.'[6] There is the same obscurity in these passages. Does Dr. Gore believe St. Paul's view to have been *an entirely spiritualized* form of the Origenistic 'germ theory'? *What exactly is it which St. Paul compares to the seed-corn?* What we cannot understand is how the Bishop combines this ambiguity in his own doctrine with such a clear conviction that it differs from the modernist belief.

Dr. Gore claims for his own view that it is harmony with the spirit of science, which, by showing us the intimate dependence of spirit on body, makes the idea of purely disembodied spirits very difficult (p. 305). It would be more to the point to say that science, by showing us the intimate connexion between our minds and the matter of our brains, makes it more difficult to understand how one can survive when the other is dissolved. In any case the Bishop is clutching at a straw. For what can science teach us of the nature of life in conditions, which, we are forced to believe, must be utterly unlike those under which our earthly existence is passed? The resurrection body, says the Bishop, we must suppose to be 'a refined sort of materiality,' and elsewhere[7] he has asserted that the resurrection body must be regarded as 'a material organ.' His view has been interpreted to mean that the real body is an indestructible 'form' or 'organizing principle,' distinct from soul or spirit, which holds together the material particles of our present bodies.[8] We recognize the Aristotelian and Thomist descent of this subtle distinction, but (supposing the concept to correspond to anything real) what we want to know is whether this 'form' or 'organizing principle' is, or is not, laid in the grave with the mortal flesh? If we hold that it is, we seem to be committed to

[4] *The Creed of a Christian*, 7th Ed., pp. 92 *f.*
[5] Italics ours.
[6] *The Religion of the Church*, p. 87.
[7] See a letter in *The Church Times*, August 8th, 1924.
[8] See a leading article in *The Church Times*, September 5th, 1924.

a refined form of the 'germ theory' of the resurrection; if we hold that it is not, but that the 'organizing principle' survives elsewhere and will, at the last day, fashion for itself a new body, whatever we may claim for this view, we cannot maintain that it is the traditional or Catholic doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The essential point seems to us to be this. Does Dr. Gore believe there to be any *material* connection between the individual body laid in the grave, and the '*material* organ' which he believes will arise? And will it arise from the grave? We do not wish to construct an artificial dilemma, but if there is any such material connection, how is the Bishop's view free from any of the scientific difficulties which he admits have made the idea of the recollection of material particles incredible? If there is no such connection, has not the Bishop abandoned the strict and historical sense of the word 'resurrection' for something indistinguishable from what the modernist means by 'the survival of all that constitutes whatever is essential to a human personality'? Why quarrel over the word 'body,' of which, in conditions that are unknown, nothing can be predicated? Moreover, it must not be forgotten in this connection that the New Testament nowhere contains the phrases 'the resurrection of the body' or 'the resurrection of the flesh.'

The Bishop's doctrine of the Judgment departs considerably from the traditional teaching, but, if somewhat modernist, is deeply ethical. 'Life is essentially a probation. Acts form habits, and habits form character, and character tends to become fixed' (p. 306). In moments of temptation 'the thought of the infinite and timeless issues of wilful sin . . . is meant to have an overpowering effect upon us,' and the repudiation of this sort of fear seems to Bishop Gore 'one of the silliest features in modern religion' (p. 307). But no thinking person does repudiate *this* sort of fear. And Bishop Gore believes that the idea that the soul of man is in its essence incorruptible and so necessarily immortal, is derived from Greek philosophy and not from Scripture' (p. 288). We believe that to establish this would require a large measure of what Bishop Gore so often condemns as arbitrary exegesis or 'criticism.' Moreover, the Bishop cherishes the hope of the final extinction of the wicked, finding the idea of everlasting torment unthinkable

(p. 308). All of which is excellent, though it will be seen that the Bishop can freely repudiate ecclesiastical tradition which does not seem good to him, when it does not happen to have received the attention of a General Council.

IX.

According to Bishop Gore there is a necessary sequence in the traditional doctrinal presentation of Christianity, and an equally necessary sequence in 'Modernism.' The difference is ultimately in the conception of God and man. Only one principle is at stake. Apart from its doctrine of God and man, 'the Bible goes for nothing' (p. 319). In Dr. Gore's opinion the modernist conception of God is always, in the last resort, a variety of pantheism, somewhat refined perhaps, but still pantheism. This is an obsession with Bishop Gore. We shall not here deal with the assertion—for it is little more—because it has been denied and refuted over and over again, notably by the late Dean Rashdall. To these denials and refutations, Dr. Gore has never paid serious attention. We confess, however, that in the conception of the relationship of man to God, there *is* a wide difference between Bishop Gore and ourselves, and a difference which tends to influence the whole of theology. This difference has its roots in conflicting views of the origin and cause of sin. The seat of *actual* sin, all are agreed, lies in the will. But what of that condition of human nature which we call 'original sin'—that 'law of sin,' as St. Paul called it? Why that relative impotence of the will by reason of which we so often do that which we would not, and fail to perform that which we will to do? According to Dr. Gore, it arose as the result of a deliberate refusal on man's part of the will of God, when this divine will, however imperfectly, was first recognized; the ensuing disaster to moral and spiritual life has, by propagation, involved the whole human race, resulting in the terribly weakened will which we all possess.

To maintain such views, when even a general assent is given to the doctrine of Evolution, seems to involve the tacit assumption that a doctrine can still be maintained when the supposed facts which alone caused the doctrine to be formulated, are known to be facts no longer. Thus Bishop Gore,

while rejecting all the crude ideas of the Fall, wishes to retain it as expressing in parable, not merely what happens in the case of each of us (to which there would be no objection), but as affording, again in parable, an explanation of the *cause* and *origin* of that weakened condition in which the will, unaided by divine grace, is unable to perform that which it wills to do. Such a view implies the immense assumption that when primitive man first became aware of the will of God in a moral law, he possessed a power of fulfilling it which neither a St. Paul nor any twentieth century man possesses. Is there any shadow of justification for such an assumption? The really important point for us to notice is this. The foregoing 'interpretation' of the doctrine of the Fall leads Bishop Gore to assert that man's original refusal of the will of God has introduced that appalling disorder into God's creation, upon which the Bishop so often insists. From this premise, further deductions are made. For if God is love, He must take redemptive action to remedy a state of affairs which has arisen contrary to His original purpose. Such redemptive action cannot be effected by the divine penetration, without intervention, of what is natural and human from within, but it must be by a miraculous re-creative act of God coming forth 'from beyond the processes of nature.'[9] It will be seen at once that this really determines in advance what the mode of the Incarnation must have been to make Redemption possible, and this is the root difference between modernists and Bishop Gore. It seem to us that his view implies not only immense and unfounded assumptions about primitive morally conscious man, but the even greater assumption that the original purpose of God and the method by which He meant to realize it are matters of knowledge; whereas in fact they are not. It seems to us that Dr. Gore's apologetic for traditional Christianity bases it on hypothesis upon hypothesis, each one less verifiable than its successor, until we *end*, rather than *begin*, with experience. Modernists agree with Dr. Gore that any theology which minimizes the nature of actual sin and refuses to stress the import-

[9] According to Dr. Gore, through the whole New Testament this conception is wholly bound up with the conception of God's love in Christ, p. 323.

ance of the relatively impotent will, weakens the need of Redemption and impairs the doctrine of Grace, thereby cutting at the roots of all religion. But it is as idle as it is usual to pretend that these spiritual realities, which are matters of experience, have any real connexion with theories of the *cause* or *origin* of what is called 'original sin.' So far as the evidence goes, this condition, or a 'law of sin,' is and always has been universal, nor is there any evidence which can justify the assertion that it could have been avoided. In these circumstances, disputes as to whether what is universal was 'necessary' or otherwise, merely take us from the basis of fact into the realm of airy abstraction wherein, as Goethe said, 'animated enquiry into cause does great harm.' Nor can modernists feel that they are in any way detracting from the reality or the necessity of the spiritual verities we call Redemption and Grace by regarding them, although historically manifested, as belonging to the eternal and spiritual world, and as revelations of the eternal creative plan, rather than as merely patching up an original divine purpose spoilt by the Fall.

REFLECTIONS ON AQUINAS

II.—Scripture and the Church.

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., author of *Science and Religion from Galileo to Bergson.*

THE distinction between Reason and Revelation as twin sources of truth creates difficulties perhaps greater than those which it claims to solve. It embarrasses, in the first place, the Christian apologist, whose task would be easier if he could appeal to some authority universally recognized among mankind—*i.e.* to the authority of Reason. As it is, although the doctrines he teaches are, on the Thomist hypothesis, not contrary to Reason; yet they could never have been, and never can be, reached by Reason. Thus the appeal to Reason will not by itself serve to enlighten the pagan or infidel.

Inasmuch as attempts were being made at the time of St Thomas both by Franciscans and Dominicans to convert Saracens and other unbelievers, this difficulty was not likely to pass

unobserved; and it was by the special request of the Master General of the Dominicans that Aquinas composed a treatise dealing with this problem.

In his works composed for the instruction and confirmation of Christian believers, Aquinas was able to assume as axiomatic the authority of Scripture, this being one of the 'principles of the science of theology, needing no demonstration. Our faith rests on the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books.'[1] But in dealing with Saracens, Moors, and even Jews, something further is required; they must be satisfied about the basis upon which faith in the authority of Scripture rests. The sixth chapter of the first book of the *Contra Gentiles*, which is paraphrased by Dante in the twenty-fourth canto of the *Paradiso*, contains the necessary guarantees, and has been summarized by Dr. Wicksteed in the following words:

> 'The divine Wisdom's self that deigned to reveal its own secrets to men, deigned also to confirm the revelation by the exhibition of powers excelling the capacity of nature, to wit, miraculous healing of diseases, raising of the dead, changing the course of the heavenly bodies, and—yet more marvellous—the sudden inspiration of simple and unlettered folk with the height of eloquence and wisdom.
>
> 'At sight of these wonders, innumerable crowds, not merely of simple folk but of the most learned of mankind, flocked to the faith; under no compulsion of arms and with no promise of delights, but rather in face of the fierce persecutions of tyrants and the demands of the faith itself to restrain all the pleasures of the flesh, to despise all earthly objects of desire, and to believe things transcending all human intelligence. These conversions, this contempt of things seen and eager reliance upon things invisible, are themselves the supreme miracle. And that they were no random sport of nature is proved by their having been long foretold in the prophetic oracles. . . .
>
> 'Far otherwise was the case of the founders of false creeds. As witness Mahomet, with the seduction of his promises of carnal delights, with the poverty of his corrupted scriptures, with the absence of confirming miracles or prophetic anticipations. . . '[2]

Thus, the authority of Scripture rests on miracle. 'The best way of convincing one who rejects truth of this sort is by the authority of Scripture *divinely confirmed by miracles*.'[3]

How far this sort of argument would prove convincing to-day, the reader must judge; yet apart from the question of

[1] *Summa Theol.* (Leon.) iv. 22*b*.
[2] *Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy*, pp. 162*f*.
[3] *Contra Gentiles*, Bk. 1, ch. ix.

miracle it may seem surprising that the primary authority for Aquinas should be Scripture, which we are accustomed to regard as primary for Protestants only. It is particularly interesting to note that the creeds are stated by him to be summaries of *scriptural* teaching. Since the truth is diffusely, and sometimes obscurely, present in Scripture, and since long study and practice is needful for its elicitation (for which all have not leisure), it was necessary to make concise summaries, which are not to be regarded in the light of additions to Scripture, but as derived from it.[4] On the whole, his view is that of our Eighth Article, but whether the view is genuinely historical need not be discussed here. Aquinas was not perhaps in a position to realize the variety of sources which contributed to the creeds, or to the theological systems which they epitomized. These had their origins not only in Scripture, but in the various systems of Greek speculative theology: though, of course, it is true also that the Scriptures themselves were not unaffected, both in language and ideas, by those systems, as well as by other contemporary ideas.

As a matter of fact, however, though Aquinas does base the Creeds upon Scripture, he looks behind the Scriptures to those who wrote them. They—*i.e.* the Apostles and Prophets—constitute the final authority, for they received the Revelation themselves directly from Christ. In a passage already quoted, St. Thomas describes Scripture as authoritative because it was written by the apostles and prophets to whom Revelation had been imparted. (*Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi Apostolis et Prophetis factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt*). The final authority is the apostles and prophets who received the Revelation, so to speak, at first hand.

This view of the derivation of the authority of Scripture at once lifts the Apostles' Creed on to a level with Scripture, for

[4] The whole passage, *Summa Theol.* (Leon.) viii. 23, is worth quoting: *Veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura diffuse continetur variis modis, et in quibusdam obscure; ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex sacra Scriptura requiritur longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenire omnes. . . . Et ideo fuit necessarium ut ex sententiis sacrae Scripturae aliquid manifestum summarie colligeretur quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Quod quidem non est additum sacrae Scripturae, sed potius ex sacra Scriptura assumptum.*

ve know from a monograph (*Opusculum*, vii, *in Symbolum Apostolorum*) that Aquinas accepted the traditional authorship of this symbol. But this is a minor point. The important thing s that to place the final authority with the apostles enables us o accept as authoritative not only what they *wrote*, but what hey *taught*, and (by a convenient expansion) not only what *they* aught but what their legitimate successors now teach.

In the light of this, the Scriptures, though written by the Apostles, must be understood as interpreted by their successors. In other words, though the Scriptures contain the Revelation, no one, without the assistance of the Church, can say what that Revelation is. This is incidentally laid down in the *Summa Theologiae*: 'Belief in all the articles of faith is clinched by one single clasp, namely, the primal truth set before us in the Scriptures, *as rightly understood in accordance with the teaching of the Church*.'[5] A very significant reservation.

The identity of the Apostolic Church with the later Church s clearly asserted by Aquinas. On the passage, '*Lo I am with you always*, even unto the end of the world,' his comment is: 'This is not understood only of the Apostles, because they have all died, and the world is not yet at an end . . . We must assert that the Church is the same in identity now as it then was (*eadem est numero Ecclesia quae tunc erat et quae nunc est*), since its faith is the same, its sacraments, authority and profession are the same. Wherefore the Apostle says, "Is Christ divided? God forbid."'[6]

Thus Church authority is made doubly safe. In the first place apostolic authority and Church authority are identified (by an historical fiction, if we choose thus to describe it). And in the second place, the apostles' teaching is expanded to cover not only what they *wrote*, but what they *taught*, and to include not only the recorded teaching of Christ, but his secret teaching also. This device opens the door wide enough to admit as apostolic anything that the Church chooses to describe as being so.

[5] The italicised passage constitutes *Omnibus articulis fidei inhaerit fides propter unum medium, scilicet propter veritatem primam propositam nobis in Scripturis secundum doctrinam Ecclesiae intellectis sane.*' (Leon., viii., 58*b*).

[6] *Quodlibet*, xii: a. 19, *contra*.

On this extra-scriptural apostolic authority, Aquinas says

> 'The Apostles, by the intimate prompting of the Holy Spirit handed down certain things to the churches for observance which they did not leave in their writings; but these have been ordained for the Church's observance through successive generations of the faithful. Whence the Apostle himself says: *Stand fast and keep the traditions which you have learned, whether through speech* (*scilicet,* published by word of mouth) *or by my epistle* (*scilicet,* transmitted by writing).'

St. Thomas goes on to include under this head of oral tradition the worship of images of Christ, 'whence also the blessed Luke is said to have painted the likeness of Christ, which is preserved at Rome."[7]

It is indeed habitually assumed by Aquinas that any practice of the Church, not to be discovered in Scripture, must rest upon oral apostolic authority. It is quite clear that we have here a controversial device of unparallelled utility, for it is, by the nature of the case, impossible to prove that any practice is *not* to be traced to oral apostolic tradition, because *ex hypothesi* we know nothing as to the contents of that tradition, save what the Church teaches.

It is very interesting to see Aquinas handling a particular case. The formula of the consecration in the Mass contains three words for which there is no written apostolic authority, *i.e.* they are not included in the New Testament records of the Institution. The words are as follows, the unscriptural three being in italics: 'Hic est enim calyx sanguinis mei, novi et *aeterni* testamenti: *mysterium fidei*: qui pro nobis et pro multis effundetur in remissimem peccatorum.' (For this is the cup of my blood, of the new and *eternal* covenant; the *mystery of faith*; which is poured out for you and for many for the remission of sins.)

After pointing out that there is scriptural authority for all these words save the three, Aquinas says, 'As for the addition of *aeterni*, and, again, of *mysterium fidei*, this is retained from the tradition of the Lord which came to the Church through the apostles, in accordance with I *Cor.* xi: 'I received from the Lord that which also I delivered unto you' (*Leon.* xii, 210*b*)'. But to us it seems almost disingenuous to suggest that the

[7] *Summa Theol.* (Leon.) xi, 279*b*. Compare also vol. vii, 109*a*: '*Apostoli multa tradiderunt quae scripta non sunt in canone, inter quae unum est de usu imaginum.*'

apostle, in giving his version (which immediately follows) of the Institution, should have kept something back. It seems more reasonable to suppose that he was giving a straightforward account of the tradition which he claims to have received.

Indeed it must be admitted that Aquinas often has to squeeze the letter of Scripture rather tight to get it to fit into the necessary mould of ecclesiastical tradition. It is really a question of trimming the facts to square with an *a priori* theory —the fundamental vice of the scholastic method. That method is often praised for being logical—we hear of its irrefragible logic. But we forget that the better the logic is, the further astray it will lead us if the premisses from which it reasons are faulty.

Roger Bacon (*b.* 1214), who was a greater man than Aquinas, though he did not attain canonization, laid his finger on the weakness of *a priori* reasoning when he wrote :

> 'There are two methods of obtaining knowledge — by argument and by experiment; argument makes conclusions and forces us to agree with them, but it does not make us feel certain or so remove suspicion that the mind rests in assurance of truth, unless this be also found by experience.' [8]

Bacon is here talking of the natural sciences, and *a priori* scientific method is what he is attacking. Yet the same principle applies in the sphere of theology. The Thomist system, for all its imposing irrefragibility, is an *a priori* system. The day for such systems, however grand or imposing, has gone. Theology to-day must be based on facts of history, of literary criticism, of psychology, etc. Only a theology so based can have a future. All other foundations are insecure. It is upon the rock of history that St. Thomas' theory of the Church has split.

[8] *Opus Majus*, Pars. vi, cap. i.

BOOK REVIEWS

A MODERNIST BISHOP*

The enterprise of the Student Christian Movement has given to English readers the opportunity of studying a small volume by an American Bishop, Dr. William Lawrence, a volume moreover which was the unwitting occasion of a theological controversy remarkable alike for its vehemence, its important consequences for American Modernists, and the wide popular

* *Fifty Years*, by William Lawrence, D.D., LL.D. (S.C.M., 1924. Price 3/6. Pp. xxxi + 87.)

interest which it aroused. The book is rendered the more valuable by a full introduction from the pen of Dr. Barnes, setting forth clearly the essential matters in debate, and providing extracts both from the Pastoral Letter issued by certain of the American Bishops in condemnation of Modernism, and the courteous and weighty reply of the whole theological faculty of the Episcopal Theological School of Cambridge, Mass.

The genesis of this book, as readers of the *Modern Churchman* (Jan., 1924) will know, was an address written by Dr. Lawrence in 1923 to mark the completion of a period of thirty years since his consecration as Bishop of Massachusetts. In form the address is an outline of the development of the Bishop's own thought during half a century, and was intended for the help and encouragement of young men, and especially of theological students, at the present day.

The careful reader cannot fail to notice many points of similarity between Dr. Lawrence and our own Dr. Sanday. True, the progress of the Bishop's thought has been less spectacular, but in charm of manner, in felicity of style, in transparent honesty of purpose, in an innate cautiousness of temper combined with a love of truth and a scorn of personal consequences, the two men are singularly alike. Dr. Lawrence is possessed of a wide sympathy and a courageous tolerance, because his faith in the basic truths of Christianity is unshaken, and has grown the stronger in the bracing atmosphere of unfettered thought. Life for the Bishop is clearly a business of absorbing interest, and he faces it in the spirit of the adventurer for whom each new day brings its own peculiar zest and joy of discovery. He has a masterly eye for essentials, whether of faith or practice, and vivid touches of personal reminiscence, lightning pen-portraits of great men, swift flashes of delicate humour, leave us with an impression of the author as clear and lifelike as the events and personalities which are brought before us in his attractive narrative.

We are made to recognize the extent of the change which has come over the mind and outlook of the ordinary man in the last fifty years owing to the progress in scientific research, the amassing of new knowledge, the employment of more effective methods in all branches of study alike, and the linking up of the world into a single neighbourhood by modern inventions. Dr. Lawrence gives us a clear picture of the hard and narrow religion commonly taught in his own boyhood, a religion owing more to the Old Testament than to the New, and proclaiming the literal truth of the whole Bible and the eternal damnation of all who had not consciously accepted Christ.

Against this background of crude and unlovely dogmatism we watch the struggles of young men and women to free themselves from unworthy fears, to attain some measure of moral and intellectual sincerity, and to accept the new discoveries of science without the loss of essential Christian beliefs. In sketching the progress of his own thought towards a frank and joyous acceptance of the more liberal outlook, Dr. Lawrence has in mind the thousands of others who went through similar experiences and fought their way out to a larger liberty and a more reasonable faith.

In the second part of his book the author discusses the question of re-statement, once more taking his own case as typical. Granted that liberal views were possible for him as an individual, what should be his attitude to creeds and liturgies employing time-honoured forms of expression which he was no longer able to accept in their literal meaning? Hard thinking brought him to the conclusion that neither a creedless Church, if such were discoverable, nor the refuge of Roman Catholicism would meet his needs. He resolved to remain in the Church of his fathers,

claiming the right to regard the old creeds, dogmas, and liturgies not as exact expressions of faith formally binding upon the individual Christian in every detail, but rather as general declarations of a whole-hearted loyalty to the one God known to experience as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

Having arrived at this decision, Dr. Lawrence discovered to his surprise how large a measure of support for his own view could be found in the Prayer Book. Wherever possible his wish is to re-state, not to discard. But in such a policy, as he conceives it, there is no trace of the desire to shirk vital issues, to escape hard thinking, or (as he himself expresses it) to substitute 'Oh! for the wings of a dove' for 'Onward, Christian soldiers' as an expression of the distinctively Christian attitude towards life.

What Bishop Lawrence calls the natural conservatism of his own mind has not produced in him any lack of sympathy with views which are not naturally congenial. For example, as against the Pastoral Letter of the Bishops, which declares without qualification that 'objections to the story of the Virgin Birth have been abundantly dealt with by the best scholarship of the day,' he is in agreement with the theological professors in their statement to the effect that from the nature of the case the evidence for the literal truth of the story can never be anything but indecisive. And he has always refused to catechize his ordination candidates as to their views on this question, caring less for a candidate's particular beliefs at the moment of his ordination, than for 'the essential trend of his thought,' and his attitude towards 'the ever-revealing truth.'

Such is the spirit and temper animating the whole of this little book. The Bishop's words will bring new hope, courage and inspiration to thousands of English Christians for whom the details of the original controversy in America would be of little interest. Indeed the Bishop himself has no wish whatever to play the part of controversialist. But his ready sympathy and breadth of mind have created in him the desire to seek truth unflinchingly, and to use the influence of his position on the side of liberty and in the highest interests of the Christian faith. *O si sic omnes!*

W. Maurice Pryke.

ERASMUS, THE REFORMER.*

Anybody who knows anything about it is quite convinced that if only the 16th century Reformation could have come in the form in which Erasmus worked for it, rather than in the form in which Luther achieved it, that it would have been better for the Church and for humanity. What, however, no one does know is whether the Reformation could have been achieved on the lines of Erasmus. Erasmus has the greatest fascination for scholars and persons of culture, but plain people appear to be much more attracted by Luther. Luther was gross and intolerant, but he had deep and ardent religious emotions, magnificent courage, and great practical ability. He appealed to the heart and conscience of his public. The appeal of Erasmus was to their intellect and to their sense of humour; yet the life and work of Erasmus are more worthy of study by men of to-day than the life and work of Luther. Luther was mainly for his own age and his own nation: Erasmus is cosmopolitan and has a message at any rate for this age as well as for his own. Mr. Elliott Binns, who happily selected Erasmus as the subject of his Hulsean Lectures (1921-22),* seems to hold the

**Erasmus, the Reformer,* a Study in Restatement, by L. Elliott Binns, B.D. (Methuen and Co.; 5/- net; 1923.)

balance very evenly between the great scholar of the Renaissance and the hero of the German Reformation. His sympathies are with Erasmus, but he recognizes the leonine qualities of Luther, and not least his sterling sincerity. He recognizes also the many defects of the Protestant Reformation, and particularly its intolerant dogmatism. Erasmus is his hero. It is true that Erasmus was not, to use his own phrase, 'a gladiator of the arena.' Indeed Professor Gwatkin once called him 'a man of Meroz'—a much milder term than Luther applied to him. But if Erasmus declined to unite with the Continental Protestants, it was because he had only very imperfect sympathy with them. Their controversial ferocity terrified him: it is true that they were contending against very real evils, but to the eyes of Erasmus it seemed possible that they were likely to cause as great evils as those they quelled. Erasmus always claimed to love peace and harmony, which really seems to have meant that he rather enjoyed making his opponents uncomfortable, provided he was not made uncomfortable in the operation himself. He scorned folly, obscurantism, superstition, fanaticism, and was willing to take infinite pains to teach mankind better; for his ideal was reformation by education. He was not, however, willing to be martyred in the process, or to seem so much in earnest as to lose his sense of humour. Can a man with such a temperament be a successful Christian reformer? To judge by the history of Christianity, he cannot. The successful Christian reformers have been 'twice-born men,' but Erasmus was of the 'once-born.' Yet, to cite the words of Charles Beard, the historian of the Reformation:

> 'To over-estimate the worth of what Erasmus did for scientific theology is simply impossible . . . His New Testament text lies at the base of all subsequent textual criticism, his editions of the Fathers first made possible the study of Christian antiquity. He compassed what was almost the whole of human knowledge, and brought it to bear upon religious truth.'

With incredible energy and patience and many-sided resourcefulness, Erasmus carried on his warfare against ignorance and especially against ignorance combined with religion. 'The monks' above all others were his adversaries and he theirs, but he beat them in the end. Pope's description of the conflict is not without a touch of humour:

> 'At length Erasmus, that great injured name,
> (The glory of the priesthood, and the shame)
> Stemmed the wild torrent of a barbarous age,
> And drove those holy Vandals off the stage.'

He died within the fold of the Church which he strove to reform, and not altogether in vain. The Counter-Reformation owes not a little to him, yet the Roman Church has shown him little gratitude. 'His later life,' as the Hulsean Lecturer points out, 'was one constant struggle against unscrupulous and venomous antagonists, and . . . his mediating position laid him open to the assaults of either side. To the extreme Catholics he was a traitor and a heretic; to the Reformers a false prophet, a very Balaam speaking words of truth but taking the hire of unrighteousness' (p. 74). His love of truth and his faith in the love and protection of God, and we must also add his sense of humour, sustained him.

These Hulsean Lectures must have been exceptionally interesting to listen to, and that not simply because Erasmus had been Lady Margaret reader in Divinity at Cambridge. We recommend Mr. Elliott Binn's volume very heartily to those who desire a simple and arresting account

of the problems which faced Church reformers in the early years of the sixteenth century and the way in which one great man tried to solve them. They will find that the situation there described is full of lessons for Church reformers to-day.

H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

CANON GOUDGE'S REPLY.

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman.*

Sir,

I have just seen, while away from books, the two letters which refer to my article; and, if I am to reply to them in the next number, must do so very hurriedly.

In relation to the question about which Mr. Holmes writes, I meant by the Church, as I explained, what the people I had in view mean by it; 'the Church' to them means the preachers of the Church of England. My point was that men of science will find, in the fact that they openly reject the Biblical cosmology, no hindrance whatever to their being communicants of this Church and taking their full part in its life and work. The same I believe to be true of the Churches of Scotland, however Calvinistic their original basis, and of the greater English Nonconformist bodies. The position of a Roman Catholic man of science is less easy to understand; Baron von Hügel would perhaps explain it. Strong obscurantist statements are sometimes made by high authority; but I doubt if any of them are *de fide*. The Christian East is not yet sufficiently educated for such questions to be pressing.

My own statement was strictly limited by its context. The wider questions, which Mr. Holmes raises, I should be glad to deal with at any time, though of course I cannot do so in a letter. Meanwhile, may I make one suggestion? It is that those who think the current teaching about the Church strangely indefinite, should ask themselves the same questions—*mutatis mutandis*— about the nation as are raised about the Church. What is 'the nation'? Is the definition of a 'trueborn Englishman' exactly the same as that of a British subject? Who has the right to speak for the nation, and how far is the nation bound by what he says? If Mr. Holmes will try his hand at these questions, and others like them, he will find, I think, that a certain raggedness of edge in his answers is not a thing for which he ought to be blamed: it arises from the nature of the subject with which he is dealing. He will not, however, on this account think meaningless such expressions as 'national character' and 'national obligations.'

With Mr. Hardwick's letter I am quite unable to deal adequately when I must catch the post. My best course, I think, will be to refer him to the Bishop of Manchester's recent book, *Christus Veritas*. I read it after my article was written, but I think that I agree with him almost exactly about miracle. For myself, I will just add this. I did not say that to admit freedom was to admit miracle. I said that the objections commonly urged against miracle from the side of science may be urged more strongly against moral freedom. Nor did I commit myself to St. Thomas' definition of miracle: I should require to understand more exactly the meaning to be attached to his words before either accepting or rejecting them. Nor do I at all desire to upset the idea of natural law. I believe that ch of the different levels of existence there is a mode, or modes,

of action proper to it, and that these exclude all others. Where I think (without being sure) that I differ from Mr. Hardwick is not in his fourth paragraph, but in his fifth. He seems to regard the amoeba and ourselves as being, as far as freedom is concerned, on the same level of existence, while I regard them as being upon different levels, in which different forms of natural law prevail. The life that may, or may not, be freely self-determined according to a moral end, is upon quite a different level from the life which has no such possibility open to it. There will be a psychology for each, but not altogether the same psychology. True moral freedom cannot possibly be a question of mere reaction to stimulus. Moreover, just as the mode of action of a man is different from that of an amoeba, so the mode of action of God appropriate in dealing with the one must be different from that appropriate in dealing with the other. I am perfectly ready to surrender the term miracle, if this is desired; all the miracles in which I believe are to me, if I may be forgiven such language, examples of the 'normal behaviour' of God.

H. L. GOUDGE.

THE BODILY RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST.

SIR,

I have read in your December number Mr. Todd's article on our Lord's Resurrection, and while agreeing that the fundamental thing for Christians is to believe the triumph of our Lord's Spirit over death and His appearance in spiritual form to His disciples, yet it does not seem that this has been the universal belief of the Church. In *St. Mark* viii, 31; ix, 9; x, 34, our Lord foretells His death to be followed by His rising again in three days. These passages and the clause in the Apostles' Creed would look as if Jesus intended to convey more than a spiritual manifestation of His presence on the third day. The Jews at the time of Christ, and long before it (not to say anything of other religions), believed in the persistence of the soul after bodily death. If this is all Jesus intended to convey with regard to Himself, it is hard to understand why the New Testament writers lay such stress both in their preaching and letters to Churches on the Resurrection of Jesus. St. Peter in *Acts* ii, 24 and 31, would seem to have believed that the Body of our Lord rose from the grave. Mr. Todd tells us that St. Paul knew nothing of the empty tomb or of the physical resurrection of Jesus, and he cites the passage from I *Cor.* in proof of this; but he does not tell us what the apostle meant by the word 'rose' and 'resurrection' in countless other passages in his epistles, for instance *Romans* i, 4; I *Cor.* xv, 4; I *Thess.* iv, 14. Why did not the apostle use the word 'appear' or some such word in these and other passages, and why did not our Lord, when foretelling His death and resurrection, say, 'The Son of Man shall be crucified, and the third day shall appear or be seen again.' It is difficult to see how the Gospel accounts of our Lord's Resurrection can be so easily disposed of as Mr. Todd seems to think. If the tomb was not empty on Easter Day, what then became of the Body of Jesus? It was the appeal to the Resurrection of Jesus that contributed more than anything else to make Christianity go on its way conquering from the very start. If the apostles only meant by the Resurrection of Jesus that His Spirit lived or had been frequently seen by them, it is difficult to believe that this would have carried any weight amongst Jews or Gentiles.

As evidence of the truth of Christianity it may not be necessary for us to believe in this doctrine, especially as no educated person now believes in the future resurrection of our bodies; but the question still remains

Is it a fact or otherwise that the Body of Jesus that was taken down from the Cross and laid in the tomb rose again, and did the first disciples believe and teach this?

JOHN WESTROPP.

KILMURRY RECTORY, LIMERICK.
December 20th, 1924.

SIR,

Your correspondent raises some interesting points, and it will be best to deal with them *seriatim*.

(1) It is true that belief in a spiritual Resurrection as opposed to a bodily Resurrection has not been the universal belief of the Church. The story of the bodily Resurrection, as told in the Gospels, ousted the earlier tradition of a spiritual Resurrection which was held by St. Paul. Not only was the former easier to grasp, but it was also a bulwark against the rising tide of Docetism—the heresy which denied that our Lord had ever appeared in the flesh. In going back behind the Gospel story to St. Paul's view, we believe that we are going back from a later to a more primitive tradition.

(2) Do *Mark* viii, 31, and ix, 9, and x, 34, contain the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus? I doubt it. May not these words have been coloured and made more definite by the later experience of the Church? If our Lord actually spoke words as definite and as pointed as these recorded by St. Mark, it is difficult to understand why the disciples were so shocked by the Crucifixion and surprised by the Resurrection. But if our Lord merely made some indefinite reference to suffering for His cause, and, forty years after His death, when St. Mark's Gospel was written, the writer, so familiar then with the story of the Crucifixion and the Resurrection, made our Lord's indefinite words definite, we can understand the situation. I would suggest, therefore, that the above verses of St. Mark's Gospel contain not the *ipsissima verba* of our Lord, but what a later generation of Christians thought He must have said.

(3) The New Testament writers lay stress on the Resurrection in their preaching and letters, because for them that event was the vindication of our Lord's Messiahship (cf. *Romans* i, 4). There is nothing inconsistent in this with their belief in a spiritual Resurrection as opposed to a bodily Resurrection.

(4) It is precarious to deduce from *Acts* ii, 24 and 31, that St. Peter believed that the body of our Lord rose from the grave. Do the words express what St. Peter really said, or are they due to St. Luke, who held a materialistic view of the Resurrection? In *Acts* xiii, 34-37, St. Luke seems to attribute to St. Paul a view of the Resurrection which the Apostle, judging from his epistles, did not hold. In *Acts* ii, 24, 31, may not St. Luke be attributing to St. Peter his own view of the Resurrection?

(5) It is true the Apostle uses the words 'rose' and 'resurrection,' but surely it is not necessary to suppose that he must have used ἀνάστασις in the literal sense of 'a standing up.' St. Paul used the ordinary terminology of his day, and his use of the word ἀνάστασις in no way conflicts with his view that the Resurrection of our Lord was a spiritual manifestation.

(6) What became of the Body? It shared the common lot of mortal bodies. If, like St. Paul, we believe that the Resurrection was a spiritual manifestation, we shall be no more concerned with what became of His Body than we shall be concerned with what became of the garments He wore.

(7) In St. Paul's letters, though he frequently appeals to the Res rection, he never appeals to the *bodily* Resurrection. There is not c word in his letters which would lead us to conclude, for example, that t Apostle shared St. Luke's belief that our Lord, after His Resurrecti ate a piece of fried fish.

(8) Your correspondent's concluding question brings the matter tc head. He asks, whether the Body of Jesus that was taken down from t Cross and laid in the tomb rose again? In my opinion the answer is N It seems to me that the story of the Resurrection in the Gospels, *in so as that story sets forth a* BODILY *Resurrection, is unhistorical,* and that t true view of the Resurrection is that which was held by St. Paul, *i.e.* t it was a spiritual manifestation of the Risen Lord.

JOHN TODD.

WATERSTOCK RECTORY,
OXON.

A MEMORIAL TO DR. RASHDALL.

SIR,

Members of the Churchmen's Union will be interested to learn tha movement is on foot to commemorate the life and work of their forn President, the late Dean of Carlisle, by a public memorial in that dioce This is to take the form of a Scholarship or Scholarships tenable at t University of Oxford by students of either sex who have already prov their ability by winning a scholarship at the University. Many su students find that, even after obtaining such a scholarship, they are una without further assistance to proceed to the University. It is believ that an endowment of this nature will worthily commemorate, not o Dean Rashdall's keen interest in education, but his special sympathy w undergraduates, more particularly of the University of Oxford, of wh he was so distinguished a member, and for so many years a tutor. It intended that the Trustees of the Fund, hereafter to be appointed, wh not hampered unduly by any rigid conditions, should take into acco not only educational fitness, but such qualifications as birth or reside in the diocese of Carlisle, and more especially the fact that the applic has been educated for some years at one of the secondary schools in t diocese.

Cheques should be sent to the Hon. Treasurer, Mr. Trevor B. Jon Midland Bank, Ltd., English Street, Carlisle, and crossed 'Rash Memorial Fund.'

R. H. LAW,
Hon. Secretary

LAZONBY RECTORY,
CARLISLE.
December 23rd, 1924.

ON THE ALTAR OF ACCURACY.

SIR,

In a note to an article of your last issue there is a slip of mine wh ought, by your favour, to be corrected. Dealing with the name 'Isma the note reads, 'So spelt in the Koran.' That might imply that I am the habit of perusing the Koran in the original, which I may say with fear of contradiction is not the case. The note should have read, ' spelt in *Sale's Koran.*'

HUBERT HANDLEY.